The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

tie accusations pronounced by the opponent, revered Buddha pal it a is not obliged to expatiate upon their refutation.» If we accept the Sanscrit, not the Tibetan, text ot the last sentence (sc. omitting na and the a of prasanga), it will mean, ((therefore revered Buddhapalita is obliged to expatiate upon a refutation of them (only) when he is himself affected by the accusations of the opponent®.

1 svata eva.

2 nirupopattika-paksa.

APPENDIX. - CANDRAKIRTI’S COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, I

But can there be a more eloquent refutation of an opponent than (the 19 . 6. proof) that he is not capable to establish his own thesis? Is there really any necessity to produce (new) counter arguments? 1

XY. Buddhapalita’ s comment vindicated from the standpoint of

FORMAL LOGIC.

However (if you insist that this must be necessarily done) and require 19. 8. that the contradiction (in the tenet of the opponent) should be disclosed by an independent argument, we maintain that Buddhapalita has done it.

If you ask, how is that? We answer: he has said,

Entities do not arise out of themselves,

Because such origination would serve no purpose.

Here the word «such» refers (to a new origination) of something by itself (already) existing.

The following words contain a comment upon this short statement. 2 20. 3. «If something already exists in its own real individuality, it does not need to be produced once more». This sentence points to the example, 3 i. e., an aualogous case admitted by the opponent where both the reason and the predicate coexist, (e. g., an existing jar). The reason is indicated by the words «existing in its own individuality)), aud the predicate is indicated by the words «because such origination would serve no purpose)). (We thus shall have the following regular syllogism —)

(Thesis. An entity does not require a second production).

(Reason. Because it exists).

(Example. Just as a jar).

(Major premise. Whatsoever exists does not require to be produced once more).

(We can indeed express a syllogism in two different ways, e. g., we can express it thus — )

1 ctnumana-badha.

2 read p. 20. S— tasya grahanaka-vakyasya. What a grahanakavakyam is appears clearly from Tatparyatika, p. 145.16 and an overwhelming multitude of similar phrasing in all Nyaya literature. The argument is first stated laconically ( grahanaka ) and then developed ( vivarana ).

3 The example is always a very important part of the Indian syllogism, pararthanumana.

It points to the particular facts on which the general rule or the major premise is established.

Apart from such formal syllogism, Indian logic knows a simple inference from one particular to another one, svarthanumana, it is a simple inference by analogy which is considered as repre¬ senting the essence of thought or of synthesis in general.

NIRVANA

APPENDIX: CANDRAKIRTI’S COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, I

20. 7. (Thesis) The word is not an eternal substance . 1

(Reason). Because it is produced.

(Major premise. Whatsoever is produced is not eternal).

(But we can put it also in another way, e. g.,) —

(Major premise). Whatsoever is produced is known to be non-eternal.

(Example). As e. g., a jar.

(Minor premise). The word is produced.

(Conclusion). Therefore, being produced, it is not eternal.

In this instance the reason (middle term) reveals itself in the minor premise, («the word is produced)), where the application of the middle term to the minor is indicated).

21. l. This is (just what Buddhapalita has done) in the present case. (He has said),

Entities do not arise out of their own self,

Since the production of what already exists is not needed.

(He might have put the same argument in another form, viz.) —

(Major premise). Whatsoever already exists does not want to be produced.

(Example). As e. g., this jar standing before us.

(Minor premise. It already exists).

(Conclusion. It needs no second production).

21. 3 The jar in its (potential) condition in a clump of clay is an example (by contrast ), 2 (since it needs to be really produced). But if you mean the jar which (already) exists by itself, such ajar is not produced (once more).

21. 4. Thus it is that the reason (i. e. the middle term in Buddhapalita’s syllogism) is the fact of direct (individual) existence, a fact which precludes a second origination (of the existent); it is expressed (in the minor premise, .the so