The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

2 xbe Sankhya maintains that, since Matter is eternal, every thing is identical with it as far as it is an impermanent manifestation of this permanent Matter. He does not deny the evolu¬ tion of this Matter into different forms. The objection, of Buddhapalita is unfair, because the Sankhya never denied the variety of the manifestations. If, therefore, na svatah—na karanatmakarn , this will contradict the principle of sntkdryavdda, but if na svatah—na karyatmakam, the Sankhya will agree, he will say sarvamkaranatmakam vidyate, karyatmakam (Idryam—dvirbhavah) na vidyate , karane nasti vivaJah, kdranam sat, karye tu tnahdn vkadah. The Vaise§ika maintains that iu the effect even the stuff is different, although related by samavdyi-karana. The Hinayana Buddhist denies the existence of a continuant stuff altogether. The Madhyamika’s intention is to show the hopeless mutual contradictions of all these views and thus in¬ directly to establish Monism. By leaving the main issue, the difference between origination and manifestation, intentionally in the dark, by taking the expressions svata utpadah ^origination out of one’s own self», satkarya «preexistence of the resultn literally, Buddhapalita secures a dialectical triumph. Bhavaviveka wishes to improve the position of the Madhyamika by pro¬ ducing a sound argument.

3 This argument of Bhavaviveka is given below, text p. 26.1.For the Sankhya all mental pheuomena and the intellect are of a physical nature, but an eternal, unchanging, motionless Spiritual Principle is reflected in them. Bhavaviveka, as a Monist, assimilates all mental phe¬ nomena, from the transcendental point of view, to this eternal unique principle. The Sankhya re¬ plies that this is not a refutation, but a corroboration of au identity between cause and effect, and that it is a self-contradiction, since it at the same time denies and accepts this identity. For Buddhapalita it is enough to point to the contradiction between utpdda&ndvidyamdnatva, he, from his transcendental point of view, neither believes in the one, nor in the other. Cp. p. 105, § XVIII.

4 Lit., 18. 1-3. «How can we have a reason „because they exist“, a reason that would either be a proof of the proved or a contradiction, for the refutation of whose proving the proved or its contradictory (character) we should take pains? Therefore, since he is quite unaffected by

NIRVANA

XIY. The Madhyamika method explained.

18 . 5 . But perhaps (we must understand Bhavaviveka to mean the following thing). Since the Madhyamika does not admit any valid reason, thesis or example, and cannot produce any independent argument, let us concede that he is incapable himself of proving what he would like to prove, viz. that there is no real causation out of the same (stuff). We also (admit that it is impossible for him) to combat the tenet of the opponent by an argu¬ ment (based upon facts the reality of which) both parties admit.

is. 7. However in accusing your opponent of contradiction you must yourself take your stand upon an argument which, in your own opinion , 1 would be free of those logical errors to which a thesis, a reason or an example are liable. But (Buddhapalita) has given no (reason and no examples), neither has he shown (his capacity) of avoiding the logical errors (pointed out by the Sankhya). Therefore the accusation (that he has proved nothing by his deduction ad absurdum) stands.

19. l. To this we answer: this is not right! Why? Because (of the following considerations). Certainly, wdieu someone is vindicating an assertion, he is desirous to convince other people, just as he is convinced himself. He must prove to his opponent the validity of that very argument by which he himself has arrived at the right conclusion.

19. s. It is indeed a general rule that the opponent should be (at length) induced to agree with that very line of argument which the respondent himself has set forth in order to prove his own thesis. But (the case of the Madhyamika is quite different). He does uot vindicate any assertion in order to convince his opponent. He has no (bona fide) reasons and examples (of which he himself is convinced). He sets forth a thesis of his own (and) undertakes to prove it. only so far it runs parallel (and destroys) the argument (of his opponent).

19. 5 . He thus brings assertions which cannot be proved . 2 He is in conflict even with himself. He (certainly) cannot convince his opponent (of this ima¬ gined thesis).