The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

The Master (Bhavaviveka) betrays indeed a certain bias for syllo- 16. 1 gistic reasoning. He would like a syllogism to be introduced at the wrong place. But according to the Madhyamika (method of dialectics) an indepen¬ dent argument is never needed. (This method consists in producing a contrathesis and then balancing two conflicting views) without admitting either of them. It has been said by Aryadeva,

If I neither admit a thing’s reality,

Nor unreality, nor both (at once),

Then, to confute me
A long time will be needed . 5

1 It would be similar to the Hinayanist and Yogacara view, sarvam ksanikam.

2 anavastha.

3 nirupapattika.

4 The Sankhya admits both utpada and svatah, i.e.,he admits that tad eva utpadyate, but he does not wish it to be an absolute identity, thus he is in conflict with himself, there is sva-upagama-virodha.

5 Lit., p. 16. 4-5, «who has no thesis „is, is not, is-is-not“, his confutation even long it is impossible to tell». Cp. Catubsataka, XVI, 25.

APPENDIX: CANDBAKlETI’S COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, I

NIRVANA

Iii the ((Repudiation of Conflicts)), (the manual of Nagarjuna), it is likewise stated,

When I have theses (of my own to prove),

I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving)

But I have none. I cannot he accused
(Of being inconsistent).

If I did (really) cognise some (separate) things,

I could then make an affirmation or a denial Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred). 1 But these (separate) things do not exist for me. 2 Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis.

XIII. The second point of Bhavaviveka, viz. that the answer of

THE SANKHYA IS LEFT UNNOTICED BY BUDDHAPALITA, REJECTED

10. ii. Thus it is that since the Madhyamika is not obliged to have an argu¬ ment of his own (in which he believes, why do you require Buddapalita) to confute the Sankhya by an independent argument, like the one (produced By yourself, viz. that) «the mind and the sense faculties 3 are not neces¬ sarily 4 identical to their cause»? (The Sankhya, indeed, has responded to this argument in the following way). «What is the meaning of your argu¬ ment? Do you deny an identity between cause and effect because an effect is really a new manifestation of the same matter, or because you deny the identity of matter itself? 5 If it is the first, then you bring against us a

1 ddi in 16. 10 refers probably to anumana.

- i. e., for the Monist.

3 adliyatmika-ayatana are the six subjective bases of our cognitions, i. e., five sense fa¬ culties and pure, undifferentiated consciousness (i vijiidna ), cp. my Central Conception, p. 7. All mental phenomena are, according to the Sankhya System, essentially physical, products of the evolution of Matter and, in this sense, they are identical with their cause or, as this is here expressed, produced out of their own self, out of the same substance. Bhavaviveka sets forth against this theory a regular syllogism, which will be analysed by Candrakirti in the sequel, p. 25. 9 ff.

4 From the Tib. ues-te, cp. M. vr, p. 17. 4.

5 Lit., p. 17. 1-18. 1. «What is here the meaning of the thesis? Is it „from self‘ ; as con¬ taining the result or „from self“ as being the cause. If from (the self) as containing the result, it is establishing the established. If from the self as being the cause it is contradiction, since every thing having origination originates as being necessarily existent as a cause.»

point which we never doubted, (we agree that the effect is a new manifes¬ tation of a continuant stuff). If it is the second, then (it is you, Buddhapalita), who are contradicting yourself,' (not I, because even you, the Monist, must agree) that every product necessarily preexists in its cause ». 2

(To this retort of the Sankhya Bhavaviveka requires that Buddha¬ palita should give a reply). But how can we (Madhyamikas who do not is. l. believe in logic altogether) produce an argument 3 (like the one produced by Bhavaviveka) about the (transcendental) reality (of all mental pheno¬ mena)? (This argument the Sankhya could indeed declare) either trivial, because he never doubted it, or self-contradicting (because it really implies the identity uf cause and effect). Why should we bother ourselves with a reply to this (imputed) irrelevance or this (imputed) self-contradiction? There¬ fore, since these accusations of the opponent are absolutely out of place, it was not incumbent upon our revered Buddhapalita to refute them . 4

1 Buddhapalita first accuses the Sankhya of self-contradiction by imputing to him the idea that an already existing thing is once more produced, although it already exists. The San¬ khya answers by accusing Buddhapalita of self-contradiction on the score that a Monist must admit the identity of cause and effect. The Vedantin, indeed, admits satkdrya-vada.