The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

(The meaning of the words) is here the following one. «At all» means is. 1 at any time. «Somewhere» means the place, it is equivalent to «in what¬ ever place». «Something» means the objects situated on the place, it is equivalent to «some things». (All this is denied — never, nowhere and none). The meaning is the following one. Never, nowhere and nothing is found which is produced out of its own self. And in the same way the three (next) predicates, (out of non-self, out of both, without a cause) must be interpreted.

It can be objected that an undesirable consequence 1 will follow, if we 13. 4. lay stress (upon the negation and maintain that entities do) not at all arise out of themselves. It will follow that they arise out of some non-self, (i. e., out of factors separate from them). No, this will not follow, since only a simple negation 2 is expressed, (without any implied affirmation of the con¬ trary). Production out of something separate will likewise be denied.

X. Identity of cause and effect denied

The argument against self-origination, (i. e., against the preexistence 13. 6 . of the effect in its material cause) must be constructed upon the same lines (which we have sketched) in our ((Introduction into the Madhyamika System».

We find there the following statement . 8

Thus,

No real advantage (will accrue)

If something will be born (that already exists).

If (something really) does exist,

Its own repeated birth is quite a nonsense.

1 prasanga.

- prasajya-prntisedha.

3 M. av. (B. B. IX), VI. 8.

14. 1

14. 4

15. 3

The Master Buddhapalita makes the following comment. «Entities do not arise out of their own self, since such origination would serve no purpose, and because the quite absurd consequence 1 would follow (that every¬ thing is eternally arising!. Indeed if things exist, there is no need to pro¬ duce them once more, and supposing an existing thing could be (once more) produced, never would it be non-nascent.»

XL Bhavaviveka assails the comment of Buddhapalita

Some philosophers (viz. Bhavaviveka) have raised objections against this (interpretation ot Buddhapalita). His comment, (they maintain),misses the mark, because

1 ) neither a reason nor an example are given,

2 ) objections are left unanswered,

3 ) it is a mere deduction ad absurdum, 2 (consequently) in contrast (with the denial) expressed, a contra-thesis and a contra-reason will emerge (by implication). (It will then follow) that entities are produced out of some¬ thing (essentially) separate from them, since this will serve a purpose, and since this will prevent (eternal new) production (of the same already exist¬ ing thing). 3

XII. The first objection of Bavaviveka answered

We consider all this attack to be ill founded. For what reason? Re¬ garding the first (objection), viz. that no (independent) reason and no example are given, we answer that this is not to the point. Why? Because (the position is the following one). An opposing party (the Sankhya System) advocates the identity of cause and effect, 4 and is invited to explain, what may be the use of causation in regard of something already existent. In

1 atiprasanga.

2 prusanga-vakya.

3 Lit., p. 15. 1-2. «Through an obversion of the subject stated, when the contrary subject, as a predicate and its appurtenance, will emerge, it will be a contradiction with the adopted principle, viz. „ entities have arisen from something extraneous, since their birth is useful and since (their birth) shall have an end‘ ! .» sddhya=paksa , taddharma—paksa-dharma, vyakti— arthapatti , krtcinta = siddhanta.

4 svata utpattih—satkaryam.

p. 95

saying that the cause is the self, you ("seemingly) maintain that one’s own self is once more produced. Now, we do not understand the meaning of a new production of what already exists. Moreover, we see (the danger of) an infinite regress. (The newly produced thing will be as long as it exists again and again produced and so on ad infinitum ). 1

But you (the Sankhya) do not really mean to maintain that an exist- 15. c. ing thing is once more produced, neither do you admit an infiuite series 2 (of self-productions). It follows that your theory (of a substantial identity be¬ tween cause and effect) is absurd 3 and, (expressed as it is), it runs against your ow r n intentions.

Now, (you think) that if (the Sankhya), our opponent, is assailed 15. 8 , merely in this way, he will not yield (to our onslaught), and an (other) rea¬ son with example is needed in order to make it (more) efficacious. But if you have detected a self-contradiction (in the argument of your) opponent 4 and he nevertheless persists (in his errors), neither will he be reduced to silence by (new r ) arguments and examples, for (his obstinacy is due) to his impudence and it is not worth our while to carry on a disputation with a fool.