Timaeus — Plato

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Moi'e difficulties.

Repulilic I. Socrates, POLEMAR- CHUS.

Justice an art of theft to be practised for the good of friends and the harm of enemies. But who are friends and enemies ?

Mistakes will sometimes happen.

Correction of the definition.

justice is an art of theft ; to be practised however ' for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies,' — that was what you were saying? No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say ; but I still stand by the latter words. Well, there is another question : By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming?

Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil. Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil : many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely? That is true. Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be- their friends? True. And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good? Clearly.

But the good are just and would not do an injustice? True. Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong? Nay, Socrates ; the doctrine is immoral. Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust? I like that better.

But see the consequence : — Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them ; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit ; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

Very true, he said ; and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words ' friend ' and ' enemy. What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked. We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good. And how is the error to be corrected? We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as

A new colour given to tJie definition. 1 1 535 seems, good; and that he who seems only, and is not good, Republic i. only seems to be and is not a friend ; and of an enemy the Socrates, same may be said. . polemar- ^ CHUS. You would argue that the good are our friends and the ^ " " 1 o appearbad our enemies? ancewemust Wpc ^^^ reality. He is a friend And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is who 'is 'as just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we "^^"j^TnT' should further say : It is just to do good to our friends when we should do they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil? good to our ■' " J good mends Yes, that appears to me to be the truth. and harm to But ought the just to injure any one at all? miL ^ ^"^ Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies. When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated? 1 he latter. To harm men Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, '^ *° '"J"''^ -J them ; and to not of dogs? injure them is Yes, of horses. ^° 1"^^^ ^^^^"^ And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, justice cannot and not of horses? produce injustice. Ui course. And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man? Certainly. And that human virtue is justice? To be sure. Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust? That is the result. But can the musician by his art make men unmusical? Certainly not. Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen? Impossible. And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad? Assuredly not. Any more than heat can produce cold? It cannot. Or drought moisture?

p. 12

Failure of the Definition.