Timaeus — Plato

is examined and found wantijig. 7 You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to Republic i. the injur)' of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not Socratrs, the repayment of a debt, — that is what you would imagine p^^^^^'*- him to say? Yes. And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?

To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him — that is to say, evil.

Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to He may have have spoken darkly of the nature of justice; for he really [^^^"[J";^^^ meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is gives to friends proper to him, and this he termed a debt. ^^^^ '' ^°°^ * ^ ' and to enemies That must have been his meaning, he said. what is evil. By heaven!

I repHed ; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us? He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies. And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what ? Seasoning to food. And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?

If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies. That is his meaning then? I think so. And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to illustrations. his enemies in time of sickness? The physician. Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea? The pilot.

And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend? In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other. But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician? ..

A further cross-examination.

Republic I. Socrates, Poi.EMAR- CHUS.

Justice is useful in contracts.

especially in the safe-keeping of deposits.

No. And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot? No. Then in time of peace justice will be of no use? I am very far from thinking so. You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as ^yZZ in war? Yes. Like husbandry for the acquisition of com? Yes. Or hke shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes, — that is what you mean? Yes. And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace? In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use. And by contracts you mean partnerships? Exactly. But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts? The skilful player. And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder? Quite the reverse. Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harpplayer is certainly a better partner than the just man? In a money partnership. Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money ; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse ; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not? Certainly. And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better? True. Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred? When you want a deposit to be kept safely. You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?

Justice turns out to be a Thief. 9 Precisely. Republic J. That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless? Socrates, That is the inference. Polemak- CHLS. And when you want to keep a prunincr-hook safe, then jus- „ . , ^ ...

But not in the tice is useful to the individual and to the state ; but when you use of money; want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser? and if so, justice IS only Clearly. useful when And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to '"^"ey o"^ ^"y- •' ^ ^ •' thing else is use them, you would say that justice is useful ; but when you useless, want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician? Certainly.

And so of all other things; — justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful? That is the inference. Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point : Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow? Certainly. And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping ^ from a disease is best able to create one? True.

And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to a new point 334 steal a march upon the enemy? norhrwho^is Certainly. best able to do Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good fo^^t eviiV^'^ thief? That, I suppose, is to be inferred. Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it. That is implied in the argument. Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief.

And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer ; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of his, affirms that lie was excellent above all men in theft and perjury. And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that ' Reading <l>v?La^aa6ac kui ladelv, ovroq, k.t.A.