Timaeus — Plato

Republic VI. Socrates, Adeimantuswhich leads upwards at last to the idea of good.

But what is the good? Some say pleasure, others knowledge, which they absurdly explain to mean knowledge of the good.

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The nature of good.

Republic VI. Socrates, Adeimantus.

Every man pursues the good, but without knowing the nature of it.

The guardian ought to know these things.

have or to seem to be what is just and honourable without the reahty ; but no one is satisfied ■ with the appearance of good — the reahty is what they seek ; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by every one. Very true, he said.

Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things, — of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?

Certainly not, he said. I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them ; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them. That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours. And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered?

Of course, he replied ; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either? Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman^ like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.

True, Socrates ; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own. Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know? Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty ; he has no right to do that : but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that * Reading avrjp KaMg: or reading dv^p Ka2,ug, ' I quite well knew from the very fir.st, that you, &c.'

those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road? Very true. And do you wish to behold what is l)lind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?

Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal ; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied. Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me.

No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, 1 would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear — otherwise, not. By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.

I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only ; take, however, this latter by way of interest *, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you. Yes, we will take all the care that we can : proceed.

Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times. What? The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define ; to all of them the term ' many ' is applied. True, he said.

And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term * many ' is apphed there is an absolute ; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each. Very true. ^ A play upon ro/cof, which means both ' offspring' and ' interest.'