Timaeus — Plato

p. 204

TJie longer road.

Republic VI. Socrates, Adeimantus. The shorter exposition of education, which has been already given, inadequate.

The guardian must take the longer road of the higher learning,

And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them^? To what do you refer? We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which they would appear ; but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded.

And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the enquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner ; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say. Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth.

But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure ; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further. Not an uncommon case when people are indolent. Yes, I said ; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and of the laws. True.

The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all whichj as we were just now saying, is his proper calling. What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this — higher than justice and the other virtues? Yes, I said, there is.

And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present — nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy ! A right noble thought 2; but do you suppose that we » Cp. IV. 435 D.

'^ Or, separating koX fiala from a^iov, ' True, he said, and a noble thought ' : or a^iov to diavdrjfia may ])Q a gloss.

shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge? Nay, I said, ask if you will ; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be 505 troublesome; for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this.

You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little ; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness? Assuredly not.

You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge? Yes. And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good? How ridiculous!

Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it — for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term ' good ' — this is of course ridiculous. Most true, he said. And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity ; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good. Certainly.

And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same? True. There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved. There can be none. Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to