Meditations — Marcus Aurelius
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS, 223God has not willed in order that my unhappiness may not depend on another. 57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not effused.
For this diffusion is extension : Accordingly its rays are called Extensions [cuci-ives] because they are extended [otto tov Iktuv^o-Ocu^} But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun's light passing through a narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is extended in a right line, and as it were is divided when it meets with any solid body which stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond ; but there the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off.
Such then ought to be the outpouring and diffusion of the understanding, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should make no violent or impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in its way ; nor yet fall down, but be fixed, and enlighten that which receives it. For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it. 58.
He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt thou feel any harm ; and if thou shalt acquire another kind of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to live. * A piece of bad etymology.
p. 22459. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with them. 60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed, both when it exercises caution and when it is employed about inquiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to its object. 61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty ; and also let every other man enter into thine.1 1 Compare Epictetus, iii. 9, 12.
IX. 1. He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest \J* divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things that are ; and things that are have a relation to all things that come into existence.1 And further, this universal nature is 1 " As there is not any action or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single and unconnected as not to have a respect to some other actions and events, so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond the compass of this present world." Again : " Things seemingly the most insignificant imaginable are perpetually observed to be necessary conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so that any one thing whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other." — Butler's Analogy, Chap. 7. See all the chapter. Some critics take r& inrdpxopra in this passage of p. 226named truth, and is the prime cause of all things that are true.
He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world ; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which lie is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth.
And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain.
And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from Antoninus to be the same as rh 6vra : but if that were so, he might have said irpbs &\\r)\a instead of irpbs r& virâpxovra. Perhaps the meaning of irpbs rh iirdpxovra may be " to all prior things. If so, the translation is still correct. See vi. 38.
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS, 223 God has not willed in order that my unhappiness may not depend on another. 57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension : Accordingly its rays are called Extensions [cuci-ives] because they are extended [otto tov Iktuv^o-Ocu^} But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun's light passing through a narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is extended in a right line, and as it were is divided when it meets with any solid body which stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond ; but there the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such then ought to be the outpouring and diffusion of the understanding, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should make no violent or impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in its way ; nor yet fall down, but be fixed, and enlighten that which receives it. For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it. 58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different kind of sensation. But if you shall have no sensation, neither will you feel any harm ; and if you shall acquire another kind of sensation, you will be a different kind of living being and you will not cease to live. * A piece of bad etymology.
224 MEDITATIONS 59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with them. 60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed, both when it exercises caution and when it is employed about inquiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to its object. 61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty ; and also let every other man enter into your.1 1 Compare Epictetus, iii. 9, 12.
IX. 1. He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest \J* divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things that are ; and things that are have a relation to all things that come into existence.1 And further, this universal nature is 1 " As there is not any action or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single and unconnected as not to have a respect to some other actions and events, so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond the compass of this present world." Again : " Things seemingly the most insignificant imaginable are perpetually observed to be necessary conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so that any one thing whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other." — Butler's Analogy, Chap. 7. See all the chapter. Some critics take r& inrdpxopra in this passage of 226 MEDITATIONS. named truth, and is the prime cause of all things that are true.
He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world ; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which lie is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth.
And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain.
And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from Antoninus to be the same as rh 6vra : but if that were so, he might have said irpbs &\\r)\a instead of irpbs r& virâpxovra. Perhaps the meaning of irpbs rh iirdpxovra may be " to all prior things. If so, the translation is still correct. See vi. 38.
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