Meditations — Marcus Aurelius
52 philosophy. (x. 6) : u Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or Nature [is a system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by nature. Here it might seem as if nature were personified and viewed as an active, efficient power ; as something which, if not independent of the Deity, acts by a power which is given to it by the Deity.
Such, if I understand the expression right, is the way in which the word Nature is often used now, though it is plain that many writers use the word without fixing any exact meaning to it. It is the same with the expression Laws of Nature, which some writers may use in an intelligible sense, but others as clearly use in no definite sense at all.
There is no meaning in this word Nature, except that which Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, " The only distinct meaning of that word Natural is Stated, Fixed, or Settled ; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i. e. to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it at once. This is Plato's meaning (De Leg. iv.
716) when he says that God holds the beginning and end and middle of all that exists, and proceeds straight on his course, making his circuit according to nature (that is, by a fixed order) ; and he is continually accompanied by justice, who punishes those who p. 53deviate from the divine law, that is, from the order or course which God observes.
When we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call gravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their resolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their generation, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death, we observe a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of experience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed and invariable.
But if this is not so, if the order and sequence of phenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in the course of an infinite progression, — and such change is conceivable, — we have not discovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order and sequence of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved according to its very nature, that is, according to its fixed order, some variation of what we now call the Order or Nature of Things.
It is also conceivable that such changes have taken place, — changes in the order of things, as we are compelled by the imperfection of language to< call them, but which are no changes ; and further it is certain that our knowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as for instance the phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever must be imperfect.
p. 54We do not fare much better when we speak of Causes and Effects than when we speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life we may use the terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct meaning to them, distinct enough at least to prevent all misunderstanding. But the case is different when we speak of causes and effects as of Things.
All that we know is phenomena, as the Greeks called them, or appearances which follow one another in a regular order, as we conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon should fail in the series, we conceive that there must either be an interruption of the series, or that something else will appear after the phenomenon which has failed to appear, and will occupy the vacant place; and so the series in its progression may be modified or totally changed.
Cause and effect then mean nothing in the sequence of natural phenomena beyond what I have said ; and the real cause, or the transcendent cause, as some would call it, of each successive phenomenon is in that which is the cause of all things which are, which have been, and which will be forever.
Thus the word Crea'cion may have a real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can conceive a first, in the present order of natural phenomena ; but in the vulgar sense a creation of all things at a certain time, followed by a quiescence of the first cause and an abandonment of
52 philosophy. (x. 6) : u Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or Nature [is a system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by nature. Here it might seem as if nature were personified and viewed as an active, efficient power ; as something which, if not independent of the Deity, acts by a power which is given to it by the Deity.
Such, if I understand the expression right, is the way in which the word Nature is often used now, though it is plain that many writers use the word without fixing any exact meaning to it. It is the same with the expression Laws of Nature, which some writers may use in an intelligible sense, but others as clearly use in no definite sense at all.
There is no meaning in this word Nature, except that which Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, " The only distinct meaning of that word Natural is Stated, Fixed, or Settled ; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i. e. to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it at once. This is Plato's meaning (De Leg. iv.
716) when he says that God holds the beginning and end and middle of all that exists, and proceeds straight on his course, making his circuit according to nature (that is, by a fixed order) ; and he is continually accompanied by justice, who punishes those who MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 53 deviate from the divine law, that is, from the order or course which God observes.
When we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call gravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their resolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their generation, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death, we observe a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of experience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed and invariable.
But if this is not so, if the order and sequence of phenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in the course of an infinite progression, — and such change is conceivable, — we have not discovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order and sequence of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved according to its very nature, that is, according to its fixed order, some variation of what we now call the Order or Nature of Things.
It is also conceivable that such changes have taken place, — changes in the order of things, as we are compelled by the imperfection of language to< call them, but which are no changes ; and further it is certain that our knowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as for instance the phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever must be imperfect.
54 PHILOSOPHY. We do not fare much better when we speak of Causes and Effects than when we speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life we may use the terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct meaning to them, distinct enough at least to prevent all misunderstanding. But the case is different when we speak of causes and effects as of Things.
All that we know is phenomena, as the Greeks called them, or appearances which follow one another in a regular order, as we conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon should fail in the series, we conceive that there must either be an interruption of the series, or that something else will appear after the phenomenon which has failed to appear, and will occupy the vacant place; and so the series in its progression may be modified or totally changed.
Cause and effect then mean nothing in the sequence of natural phenomena beyond what I have said ; and the real cause, or the transcendent cause, as some would call it, of each successive phenomenon is in that which is the cause of all things which are, which have been, and which will be forever.
Thus the word Crea'cion may have a real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can conceive a first, in the present order of natural phenomena ; but in the vulgar sense a creation of all things at a certain time, followed by a quiescence of the first cause and an abandonment of
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