Meditations — Marcus Aurelius
p. 58all that his words must mean, even if the result is that they mean what he did not mean ; and if we find this contradiction, it is not our fault, but his misfortune. Now Antoninus is perhaps somewhat in this condition in what he says (x. 26), though he speaks at the end of the paragraph of the power which acts, unseen by the eyes, but still no less clearly. But whether in this passage (x.
26) he means that the power is conceived to be in the different successive causes (amcu), or in something else, nobody can tell. From other passages, however, I do collect that his notion of the phenomena of the universe is what I have stated. The Deity works unseen, if we may use such language, and perhaps I may, as Job did, or he who wrote the book of Job.
"In him we live and move and are," said St. Paul to the Athenians; and to show his hearers that this was no new doctrine, he quoted the Greek poets. One of these poets was the Stoic Cleanthes, whose noble hymn to Zeus, or God, is an elevated expression of devotion and philosophy. It deprives Nature of her power, and puts her under the immediate government of the Deity.
M Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, Obeys and willing follows where thou leadest. Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth, Nor in the ethereal realms, nor in the sea, Save what the wicked through their folly do. Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a di
MARCUS AURELIUS ANT0NINTJ8. 59 vine power and government was founded on his perception of the order of the universe. Like ' Socrates (Xen. Mem. iv. 3, 13, &c), he says that though we cannot see the forms of divine powers, we know that they exist because we see their works. " To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshippest them ?
I answer, in the first place, that they may be seen even with the eyes ; in the second place, neither have I seen my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate them." (xii. 28, and the note. Comp. Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6 ; Xen. Mem. i. 4, 9; Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29; St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, i.
19, 20 ; and Montaigne's Apology for Raimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This is a very old argument, which has always had great weight with most people, and has appeared sufficient. It does not acquire the least additional strength by being developed in a learned treatise. It is as intelligible in its simple enunciation as it can be made.
If it is rejected, there is no arguing with him who rejects it: and if it is worked out into innumerable particulars, the value of the evidence runs the risk of being buried under a mass of words.
6G PHILOSOPHY. Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power or an intellectual power, or that he has such a power, in whatever way he conceives that he has it, — for I wish simply to state a fact, — from this power which he has in himself, he is led, as Antoninus says, to believe that there is a greater power, which, as the old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole universe as the intellect1 (vovs) pervades man.
1 I have always translated the word wvs, " intelligence" or "intellect. It appears to be the word used by the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion of "intelligence" as opposed to the notion of " matter. I have always translated the word X670S by " reason," and \0y11c6s by the word "rational," or perhaps sometimes "reasonable," as I kave translated voepds by the word " intellectual.
Every man who has thought and has read any philosophical writings knows the difficulty of finding words to express certain notions, how imperfectly words express these notions, and how care, lessly the words are often used. The various senses of the word X670S are enough to perplex any man.
Our translators of the New Testament (St. John, c. i.) have simply translated 6 X670J by " the word," as the Germans translated it by "das Wort;" but in their theological writings they sometimes retain the original term Logos. The Germans have a term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest to our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which we cannot conceive as being other than what they are.
Such are what some people have called the laws of thought, the conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first principles, which need no proof and cannot be proved or denied. Accordingly the Germans can say, " Gott ist die hochste Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans have also a word Verstand, which seems to represent our word " understanding," " intelligence," " intellect," not a* a thing abso-
58 PHILOSOPHY. all that his words must mean, even if the result is that they mean what he did not mean ; and if we find this contradiction, it is not our fault, but his misfortune. Now Antoninus is perhaps somewhat in this condition in what he says (x. 26), though he speaks at the end of the paragraph of the power which acts, unseen by the eyes, but still no less clearly. But whether in this passage (x. 26) he means that the power is conceived to be in the different successive causes (amcu), or in something else, nobody can tell. From other passages, however, I do collect that his notion of the phenomena of the universe is what I have stated. The Deity works unseen, if we may use such language, and perhaps I may, as Job did, or he who wrote the book of Job. "In him we live and move and are," said St. Paul to the Athenians; and to show his hearers that this was no new doctrine, he quoted the Greek poets. One of these poets was the Stoic Cleanthes, whose noble hymn to Zeus, or God, is an elevated expression of devotion and philosophy. It deprives Nature of her power, and puts her under the immediate government of the Deity. M You all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, Obeys and willing follows where you leadest. Without you, God, nothing is done on earth, Nor in the ethereal realms, nor in the sea, Save what the wicked through their folly do." Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a di
MARCUS AURELIUS ANT0NINTJ8. 59 vine power and government was founded on his perception of the order of the universe. Like ' Socrates (Xen. Mem. iv. 3, 13, &c), he says that though we cannot see the forms of divine powers, we know that they exist because we see their works. " To those who ask, Where have you seen the gods, or how do you comprehend that they exist and so worshippest them ? I answer, in the first place, that they may be seen even with the eyes ; in the second place, neither have I seen my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate them." (xii. 28, and the note. Comp. Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6 ; Xen. Mem. i. 4, 9; Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29; St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, i. 19, 20 ; and Montaigne's Apology for Raimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This is a very old argument, which has always had great weight with most people, and has appeared sufficient. It does not acquire the least additional strength by being developed in a learned treatise. It is as intelligible in its simple enunciation as it can be made. If it is rejected, there is no arguing with him who rejects it: and if it is worked out into innumerable particulars, the value of the evidence runs the risk of being buried under a mass of words.
6G PHILOSOPHY. Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power or an intellectual power, or that he has such a power, in whatever way he conceives that he has it, — for I wish simply to state a fact, — from this power which he has in himself, he is led, as Antoninus says, to believe that there is a greater power, which, as the old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole universe as the intellect1 (vovs) pervades man.
1 I have always translated the word wvs, " intelligence" or "intellect. It appears to be the word used by the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion of "intelligence" as opposed to the notion of " matter. I have always translated the word X670S by " reason," and \0y11c6s by the word "rational," or perhaps sometimes "reasonable," as I kave translated voepds by the word " intellectual.
Every man who has thought and has read any philosophical writings knows the difficulty of finding words to express certain notions, how imperfectly words express these notions, and how care, lessly the words are often used. The various senses of the word X670S are enough to perplex any man.
Our translators of the New Testament (St. John, c. i.) have simply translated 6 X670J by " the word," as the Germans translated it by "das Wort;" but in their theological writings they sometimes retain the original term Logos. The Germans have a term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest to our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which we cannot conceive as being other than what they are.
Such are what some people have called the laws of thought, the conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first principles, which need no proof and cannot be proved or denied. Accordingly the Germans can say, " Gott ist die hochste Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans have also a word Verstand, which seems to represent our word " understanding," " intelligence," " intellect," not a* a thing abso-
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