Meditations — Marcus Aurelius
p. 79they have not determined about me individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least ; and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them.
But if they determine about nothing — which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neithar sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us ; but if however the gods determine about none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution (/carao-KcvT}) and nature.
But my nature is rational and social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome ; but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me " (vii. 44). It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to state the emperor's opinions on all the ways in which a man may profitably use his understanding towards perfecting himself in practical virtue.
The passages to this purpose are in all parts of his book, but as they are in no order or connection, a man must use the book a long time before he will find out all that is in it. A few words may be added here. If we analyze all other things, we p. 80find how insufficient they are for human life, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone is indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue cannot be considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult to explain the notion fully to himself, or to expound it to others in such a way as to prevent cavilling.
Virtue is a whole, and no more consists of parts than man's intelligence does ; and yet we speak of various intellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the various powers which man's intellect shows by his works.
In the same way we may speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical sense, for the purpose of showing what particular virtues we ought to practice in order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as much as man's nature is capable of. The prime principle in man's constitution is social.
The next in order is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, when they are not conformable to the rational principle, which must govern. The third is freedom from error and from deception. " Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these things go straight on and it has what is its own " (vii. 55). The emperor selects justice as the virtue which is the basis of all the rest (x. 11), and this had been said long before his time.
p. 81It is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by justice as a disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in conformity to this disposition ; but experience shows that men's notions about justice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with the true notion of justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear enough, but not practical enough for all mankind.
" Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things which come from the external cause ; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature " (ix. 31). In another place (ix.
1) he says that " he who acts unjustly acts impiously," which follows of course from all that he says in various places. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and as a means to virtue, which no doubt it is : for lying even in indifferent things weakens the understanding ; and lying maliciously is as great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as showing an habitual disposition, and viewed with respect to consequences.
He couples the notion of justice with action. A man must not pride himself on having some fine notion of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his justice in act, like St. James's notion of faith. But this is enough.
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 79 they have not determined about me individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least ; and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them.
But if they determine about nothing — which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neithar sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us ; but if however the gods determine about none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution (/carao-KcvT}) and nature.
But my nature is rational and social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome ; but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me " (vii. 44). It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to state the emperor's opinions on all the ways in which a man may profitably use his understanding towards perfecting himself in practical virtue.
The passages to this purpose are in all parts of his book, but as they are in no order or connection, a man must use the book a long time before he will find out all that is in it. A few words may be added here. If we analyze all other things, we 80 PHILOSOPHY. find how insufficient they are for human life, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone is indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue cannot be considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult to explain the notion fully to himself, or to expound it to others in such a way as to prevent cavilling.
Virtue is a whole, and no more consists of parts than man's intelligence does ; and yet we speak of various intellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the various powers which man's intellect shows by his works.
In the same way we may speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical sense, for the purpose of showing what particular virtues we ought to practice in order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as much as man's nature is capable of. The prime principle in man's constitution is social.
The next in order is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, when they are not conformable to the rational principle, which must govern. The third is freedom from error and from deception. " Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these things go straight on and it has what is its own " (vii. 55). The emperor selects justice as the virtue which is the basis of all the rest (x. 11), and this had been said long before his time.
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 81 It is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by justice as a disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in conformity to this disposition ; but experience shows that men's notions about justice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with the true notion of justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear enough, but not practical enough for all mankind. " Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things which come from the external cause ; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to your nature " (ix. 31). In another place (ix. 1) he says that " he who acts unjustly acts impiously," which follows of course from all that he says in various places. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and as a means to virtue, which no doubt it is : for lying even in indifferent things weakens the understanding ; and lying maliciously is as great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as showing an habitual disposition, and viewed with respect to consequences. He couples the notion of justice with action. A man must not pride himself on having some fine notion of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his justice in act, like St. James's notion of faith. But this is enough.
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