Encheiridion — Epictetus

18 Zbe Discourses of Bpictetus eut endure to dwell in this place where he has put you. Short indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear for those who are so disposed ; for what tyrant, or what thief, or what courts of justice are formidable to those who have thus considered as things of no value the body and the possessions of the body ? Wait then, do not depart without a reason.

Of Contentment. — With respect to gods, there are somcwho say that a divine being does not exist ; others say that it exists, but is inactive an d careless, and takes no forethought about anything ; a third class say that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about great things and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth ; a fourth class say that a divine being exercises forethought both about things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and not about things severally.

There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Socrates belong, who say : I move not without thy knowledge.— Iliad, x., 278. Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire about each of these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if there are no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them ? And if they exist, but take no car? of anything, in this case also how will it be right

Cbe Discourses of JCpictetus 19 to follow them ? But if indeed they do exist and look after things, still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor in fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow them) ? The wise and good man then, after considering all these things, submits his own mind to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state.

He who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed with this intention, How shall I follow the gods in all things, how shall I be contented with the divine administration, and how can I become free ? For he is free to whom everything happens according to his will, and whom no man can hinder. What then, is freedom madness ? Certainly not ; for madness and freedom do not consist.

But, you say, I would have everything result just as I like, and in whatever way I like. You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not know that freedom is a noble and valuable thing ? But for me inconsiderately to wish for things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the matter of writing ? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose ?

No, but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. And how with respect to music ? In the same manner. And what universally in

20 Zbe Discourses of JEpictetus every art or science ? Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of no value to know anything, if knowledge were adapted to tvtrs man's whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest and the chief tiling, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to will inconsiderately ? By no means ; but to be instructed is this, to learn to wish that everything may happen as it does. And how do things happen ?

As the disposer has disposed them? And he has appointed summer and winter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such opposites for the harmony of the whole ; and to each of us he has given a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and companions. What then remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce with them ?

Is there such a method by which they shall do what seems fit to them, an.d we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable to nature ? But you are unwilling to endure, and are discontented ; and if you are alone, you call it solitude ; and if you are with men, you call them knaves and robbers ; and you find fault with your own parents and children, and brothers and neighbors. But you ought when you are alone to call this condition by the oame of tranquillitv and Freedom, and to think your