Encheiridion — Epictetus

196 Gbe Discourses of Eplctetus refuted : he is an ass ; in another man the sense of shame is become dead : he is good for nothing, he is anything rather than a man. This man seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast. What then? would you have me to be despised ? — By whom ? by those who know you ? and how shall those who know you despise a man who is gentle and modest ?

Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you ? What is that to you ? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who know not his art. But they will be more hostile to me for this reason. Why do you say "me"? Can any man injure your will, or prevent you from using in a natural way the appearances which are presented to you? In no way can he. Why then are you still disturbed and why do you choose to show yourself afraid ?

And why do you not come forth and proclaim that you are at peace with all men whatever they may do, and laugh at those chiefly who think that they can harm you ? These slaves, you can say, know not either who I am, nor where lies my good or my evil, because they have no access to the things which are mine. In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the besiegers (and say) : What

Gbe BHscourses ot Bptctetus 197 trouble these men are now taking for nothing ; our wall is secure, we have food for a very long time, and all other resources. These are the things which make a city strong and impregnable ; but nothing else than his opinions makes a man's soul impregnable. For what wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession is so safe, or what honor (rank, character) so free from assault (as a man's opinions) ?

All (other) things everywhere are perishable, easily taken by assault, and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must be disturbed, except what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires disappointed, and fall into things which he would avoid.

Then do we not choose to make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us, and do we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is perishable and servile and to labor at the things which are imperishable and by nature free ; and do we not remember that no man either hurts another or does good to another, but that a man's opinions about each thing, is that which hurts him, is that which overturns •him ; this is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war?

That which made Eteocles and Polynices enemies was nothing else than this opinion which they had about royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one

19S Zbe Discourses o( Bptctetus is the extreme of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is the nature of every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad ; to consider him who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son, or a father.

For nothing is more akin to us than the good ; therefore, if these things (externals) are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, nor a brother to a brother, but all the world is everywhere full of enemies, treacherous men, and sycophants.

But if the will (7rpoaipe<jti, the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is the only good ; and if tiie will being such as it ought not to be, is the only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling ? about what ? about the things which no not concern us? and strife with whom ? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the chief things ?

Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very ill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful ?) son. Against those who Lament over being Pitied. — I am grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether theu is the fact of your being pitied a thing which concerns you or those who pity you ? Well, is it in your power to 6top