Encheiridion — Epictetus

Zbc Discourses of Bptctetus 4b he was at Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are the ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are corrupted. On Constancy (or Firmness). — The being (nature) of the good is a certain will ; the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What, then, are externals ?

Materials for the will, about which the will being conversant shall obtain its own good or evil. How shall it obtain the good ? If it does not admire (overvalue) the materials ; for the opinions about the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will good : but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. God has fixed this law, and says, "If you would have anything good, receive it from yourself.

You say, No, but I will have it from another. Do not so : but receive it from yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and calls me, I say, Whom do you threaten ? If he says, I will put you in chains, I say, You threaten my hands and my feet. If he says, I will cut off your head, I reply, You threaten my head. If he says, I will throw you into prison, I say, You threaten the whole of this poor body. If he threatens me with banishment, I say the same.

46 Zbe Discourses of Bpfctctus Does he then not threaten you at all ? If I feel that all these things do not concern me, he does not threaten me at all ; but if I fear any of them, it is I whom he threatens. Whom then do I fear ? the master of what ? The master of things which are in my own power ? There is no such master. Do I fear the master of things which are not in my power? And what are these things to me ?

Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings? I hope not. Who among us teaches to claim against them the power over things which they possess ? Take my poor body, take my property, take my reputation, take those who are about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things, they may truly accuse me. Yes, but I intend to command your opinions also. And who has given you this power? How can you conquer the opinion of another man ?

By applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer it. Do you not know that opiuion conquers itself, and is not conquered by another? But nothing else can conquer will except the will itself. For this reason too the law of God is most powerful and most just, which is this : Let the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten are stronger than one. For what? For putting in chains, for killing, for dragging whither they choose, for taking away

Gbe Discourses of Epfctetus 4? what a man has. The ten therefore conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. In what then are the ten weaker? If the one possesses right opinions and the others do not. Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter? How is it possible ? If we were placed in the scales, must not the heavier draw down the scale in which it is. How strange then that Socrates should have been so treated by the Athenians.

Slave, why do you say Socrates ? Speak of the thing as it is : how strange that the poor body of Socrates should have been carried off and dragged to prison by stronger men, and that anyone should have given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it should breathe out the life. Do these things seem strange, do they seem unjust, do you on account of these things blame God? Had Socrates then no equivalent for these things?

Where then for him was the nature of good? Whom shall we listen to, you or him? And what does Socrates say? " Anytus and Melitus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me. And further, he says, "If it so pleases God, so let it be. But show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him who is superior in principles. You will never show this, nor come near showing it ; for this is the taw of