Encheiridion — Epictetus

Zbe Discourses of JEpictetus 139 the world going to be turned upside down when you are dead? Why then do you flatter the physician ? Why do you say if you please, master, I shall be well ? Why do you give him an opportunity of raising his eyebrows (being proud; or showing his importance) ?

Do you not value a physician, as you do a shoemaker when he is measuring your foot, or a carpenter when he is building your house, and so treat the physician as to the body which is not yours, but by nature dead ? He who has a fever has an opportunity of doing this : if he does these things, he b as what belongs to him.

For it is not the business of a philosopher to look after these externals, neither his wine nor his oil nor his poor body, but his own ruling power. But as to externals how must he act ? so far as not to be careless about them. Where then is there reason for fear ? where is there then still reason for anger, and of fear about what belongs to others, about things which are of no value?

For we ought to have these two principles in readiness, that except the will nothing is good nor bad ; and that we ought not to lead events, but to follow them. My brother ought not to have behaved thus to me. No, but he will see to that ; and, however he may behave, I will conduct myself towards him as I ought. For this is my own business ; that belongs to

X40 Zbc ^Discourses of Bptctetus another : no man can prevent this, the other thing can be hindered. About Exercise. — We ought not to make our exercises consist in means contrary to nature and adapted to cause admiration, for if we do so, we who call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ at all from jugglers. For it is difficult even to walk on a rope ; and not only difficult, but it is also dangerous.

Ought we for this reason to practise walking on a rope, or setting up a palm-tree, or embracing statues? By no means. Every thing which is difficult and dangerous is not suitable for practice ; but that is suitable which conduces to the working out of that which is proposed to us. And what is that which is proposed to us as a thing to be worked out ? To live with desire and aversion (avoidance of certain things) free from restraint.

And what is this ? Neither to be disappointed in that which you desire, nor to fall into anything which you would avoid. Towards this object then exercise (practice) ought to tend.

For since it is not possible to have ycur desire not disappointed and your aversion free from falling into that which you would avoid, without great and constant practice, y ->u must know that if you allow your desire and aversion to turn to things which are not within the power

Gbe Discourses of Bpictetus 141 of the will, you will neither have your desire capable of attaining your object, nor your aversion free from the power of avoiding that which you would avoid.

And since strong habit leads (prevails), and we are accustomed to employ desire and aversion only to things which are not within the power of our will, we ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise.

Then at last, if occasion presents itself, for the purpose of trying yourself at a proper time you will descend into the arena to know if appearances overpower you as they did formerly. But at first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself: the contest is unequal between a charming young girl and a beginner in philosophy. The earthen pitcher, as the saying is, and the rock do not agree.

What Solitude is, and what Kind of Person a Solitary Man is. — Solitude is a certain condition of a helpless man. For because a man is alone, he is not for that reason also solitary ; just as though a man is among numbers, he is not therefore not solitary. When then we have lost either a brother, or a son, or a friend on whom we were accustomed to repose, we say that we are left solitary,