Encheiridion — Epictetus

120 Cbe Discourses of Bpictetus wheu you praise many persons without partiality ; do you praise the just or the unjust? The just. Whether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate? The moderate. And the temperate or the intemperate ? The temperate.

If then you make yourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourself beautiful ; but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly {aioxpov), even though you contrive all you can to appear beautiful. In what a Man ought to be Exercised who has Made Proficiency ; and that we Neglect the Chief Things. — There are three things (topics, roitoi) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good.

The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not desire. The second concerns the movements towards an object and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not carelessly.

The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, and generally it concerns the assents (6vyHaraQ£6fi$). Of these topics the chief and the most urgent is that which relates to the affects (rd irdOr/, per-

Zbe Discourses of Bplctetus 121 turbations) ; for an affect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain that which a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish to avoid. This is that which brings in perturbations disorders, bad fortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and envy ; that which makes men envious and jealous ; and by these causes we are unable even to listen to the precepts of reason.

The second topic concerns the duties of a man ; for I ought not to be free from affects {a.7CaBrj) like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations (dxtdcii) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen.

The third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are making proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that not even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxication, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our power.

But the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and the second (the affects and duties), employ themselves on the third, using sophistical arguments (/uezcx- 7ri7trovrcxS), making conclusions from questioning, employing hypotheses, lying. For a man must, it is said, when employed on these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who must ? The wise and good man. This

122 Gbe Discourses of Bpictetus then is all that is wanting to you. Have you successfully worked out the rest ? Are you free from deception in the matter of money ? If you see a beautiful girl do you resist the appearance ? If your neighbor obtains an estate by will, are you not vexed? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeable firmness of mind (djuera7tru>6ia) ?

Wretch, you hear these very things with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and with inquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come and tell you that in a certain conversation in which the question was, Who is the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a certain person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only a finger's length stretches out to two cubits.

But if another who is present says, You are mistaken ; it is not worth while to listen to a certain person, for what does he know ? he has only the first principles, and no more? then you are confounded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately, I will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher. It is seen by these very things : why do you wish to show it by others?

Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of the sophists in this way by stretching out his middle finger? And then when the man was wild with rage,