The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

1 hetu-pratyaya, the first of the four pratyayas. This classification of conditions into four varieties is not what to our requirements should be a strictly systematic classification, all members are not exclusive of one another. Thus the general condition is contrasted with the special one (■ adhipati ), but it includes the two others which are only its varieties. It also embraces 5 causes of the fteftt-classification, 1) sabhaga-hetu, relation of homogeneity between the preced¬ ing and the following moments of the same thing, producing the illusion of its duration, or moral homogeneity among the subsequent elements of a personality. This hettt-classification is also unsystematical, because the sixth class, the kdrana-hetu has two varieties, the efficient and the non-efficient one ( nus-bcas , nus-med), the first is the same as the predominant condition adhipati-pratyaya or asadharana-karana, the second is an expression of the dependence of a given point-instant upon the condition of the whole Universe ( sarve dharmah) cp. above p. 41 n. 6. 2-3) sahabhu and samprayukta-ketu , relations of coexistence according to which some elements of Matter and Mind never appear alone, but always together, 4) vipaka-hetu which is another name for karma and b)sarvatraga-hetu, moral homogeneity among coexisting elements. Cp. Ah. Kosa,II. 50 ff.

2 Lit., what «turns out.» {,nirrarlaka).

appendix: candkakIkti’s comment on relativity, i 173 would be subject to both the above strictures together. So it is that, since there is no production of effects (from the Monist’s point of view), neither are there any creative causes.

Cosequently the argument that causes must exist because their essence 83. 13. (or function) has been defined does not hold good iu the present case.

XLVI. The object, a condition of mental phenomena.

The author now proceeds to deny the (second condition), the condition 83. 14 . consisting in the fact that (every mental phenomenon) has an objective counterpart (upon which it is intent).

VIII. A (mental) Ens is reckoned as an element,

Separately from its objective (counterpart).

Now if it (begins)by having no objective counterpart,

How can it get one afterwards?

What are the elements 1 of existence which are here in (the Hma : 84. 3. yanist’s system) characterized as possessors of an objective counterpart? 2 Consciousness, (i.e., pure, indefinite sensation) 3 and definite mental pheno¬ mena. 4 Such are the words of Scripture. When consciousness (is awakened), or definite mental phenomena produced, they are intent 5 upon some object (which transcends them), whether it be a patch of colour or some other object corresponding (to the sensation). These are then called the objective con¬ ditions 6 (of those mental elements).

(It is now asked), is this objective condition imagined (for sen- 84. 4. sation) already existing, or for sensation not yet produced? In the first case the objective condition becomes useless. Indeed the objective conditon is assumed in order to account for the production of this element, 7 (sensation). But this element then really exists before the objective (cause has begun to operate).

Indeed in this case the element (consciousness) would be established as 84. r>. existing by itself, separately from ist objective cause. Why would we then imagine it influenced by an (external) object?

Thus consciousness and similar elements would appear as existent 84. 7. and real, separately from their objective counterparts. Then it would simply he your fancy to call them possessors of au objective counterpart. 8 They would have altogether no (real) relation to objects.

1 dkarma. 2 salambana. :t citta. 4 caittn.

6 alambanena utpadyante. 6 alambana-pratyaya. 7 dharma. * salambana.

Nil,’VAN A

84. 9. Now (let us examine the other alternative). We then imagine that a sensa¬ tion not yet existing has already an object. This is also impossible. Because an element which has been entered into the system of elements separately from its objective counterpert is, in any case, an existing element. But (to imagine) an unexisting element combining with an object (is quite impossible). 1

85. l. The (first) sentence (of the above verse) must be supplemented thus —

«you call possessor of an object » a (mental) Ens which (in the system) is reckoned as an element separately from its object.

(The second sentence of the verse contains a question),

Now if it begins by having no objective counterpart
How can it get one afterwards?

85. 4. This is the reason expressed in the form of a question. 2 The meaning is the following one. If an element cannot exist without being intent upon an object, if it is not real, wherefrom will then the object appear? If the object-maker 3 is absent, neither can the object exist.

85. g. But then how are we to understand (the Scriptural) evidence that mind and mental phenomena must have an object? The question is trivial! 4 (Yes they have an object), if the rule be considered (from the empirical standpoint) of contingent reality, not (from the transcendental standpoint.) of absolute reality.

XLVII. The causa materialis denied.