The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

2 This variety of causation is probably the precursor of the nimitta-karana , asadhdranakarana, sadhakatama karana or karana of the Nyaya-Vaise?ika. The eye, t. g., is the adhipati-pratyaya of a visual sensation. But it cannot be identified with our causa effieiens because such a conception has, strictly speaking, no place in the Buddhist system. Causation in the world-process is imagined as quite impersonal, the separate bits of reality are following oue another automatically. Karma itself is a separate element, it is not personal in theory. All results are therefore automatical, the natural outflow ( nisyanda-phala) of conditions. Some results are very characteristically called « anthropomorphic » [purusa-kara-phala — purusena iva Jcrta), they are also conceived as automatical, but only appearing as though they were produced by a conscious will. Cf. Ab. Kosa, II. 5G ff.

3 nihsvabhava — sunya.

4 adhipati-pra tyaya.

appendix: candrakIetis comment on RELATIVITY, I suit (inevitably) appears. But since all separate entities 1 (from the Monist’s point of view) have only a relative origination 2 and no real (independent) existence, 3 the (definition of causation expressed in the words «this being, that appea,rs» then loses every meaning). What is indeed the meaning of the word «this» which is supposed to point to a cause, and what the meaning of the word «that» which is supposed to point to its result? It is true, a defi¬ nition is given, but Causality is not thereby established. 4

(The Hlnayanist) makes the following objection. After having observed 87. 4. that a piece of cloth is produced out of threads, we conclude that the existence of threads etc. is a necessary condition for the existence of a piece of cloth.

We answer. (From the standpoint of transcendental reality) it is just 87. 5. the production of such separate results as cloth etc. that is ultimately 5 denied. How can we then admit that their supposed conditions are really causes? That the production of such results as cloth etc. is (ultimately) unreal, this Nagarjuna makes clear in the following words,

XI. Neither singly in anyone of these conditions, 87 . 7.’

Nor together in all of them
Does the (supposed) result reside.

How can you out of them extract,

What in them never did exist?

The cloth, indeed, does not exist neither in the threads, nor in the 87. 9. weavers brush, nor in his loom, nor in the shuttle, nor in the pins or other causes taken singly. We do not perceive in them (any cloth). Moreover from a plurality of causes a plurality of effects would be expected. And since the cloth does not exist in any one of its parts taken singly, it neither does exist in all of them, in the threads etc., taken together.

(If we would admit that every single cause contributes its part to the 87. n. general result), we would be obliged to admit that one result is produced

1 bhavdndm.

2 praiitya-samutpannatva = Sunyaid.

3 svabhdva-abhdva -= Sunyata.

4 Lit., p. 87. 1-3. « Since there is non-existence of self-existence of the entities because of their Dependently-together-origination, wherefrom that which is pointed to by «this» as a cause, wherefrom that which is pointed to by «tbat» a9 a result? Therefore, albeit from a definition, there is no establishment of conditions*.

,-varupatah.

87. 11.

87. 13.

88 . 3 .

88 . 5 .

• 88 . 6 .
• 88 . 7 .

88 . 9 .

88 . 10 .

1/8 NIRVANA

piece-weal. Therefore since there are really no results, neither can the existence of causes as separate entities 1 he admitted.

XII. Supposing from these causes does appear
What never did existinthem.

This is what (the Hlnayanist) maintains.

Out of non-causes then
W T hy does it not appear?

The result does not preexist in those things which (admittedly) are not its causes. (And we have seen that it neither does preexist in those things which admittedly are its causes). Why then is a piece of cloth never produced out of straw and other things which admittedly are not its causes? From the standpoint of ultimate reality 2 we then deny the production of results altogether.

(The Hlnayanist) makes here the following objection. If the result were really one thing and its causes something separate, then we would under¬ stand your solicitude about the question whether the result preexists in the causes (or not)? But the result is not something outside its causes. On the contrary, it includes them in itself, (the presence of the whole complex of all the causes of a given event is equivalent to the production of the latter). (Nagarjuna) says,

XIII. The result a cause - possessor,

But causes not even self-possessors.

How can result be cause-possessor,

If of non-self-possessors it be a result.

You maintain that there is a possessive relation between a result and its causes, i. e., that the result is simply a modification 3 of its causes. This is wrong, because these (supposed) causes do not possess their own selves, i. e., they are no real causes. 4

It is asserted that a piece of cloth consists of threads. The cloth then could be (a reality) if the threads themseves had ultimate reality. 5 But they

1 svabJidvatah. 2 svarupatah — tattvatah.

3 pratyaya-vikdrah. 4 apratyaya-svabhdvah.

5 svabhava-siddlia.

appendix: candrakIrtfs comment on relativity, i 179