The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

The second birth of something born
Should never be admitted, etc.

«). 12 . Neither is the existence of an energy to be assumed (in the causes) previously (to the sensation) produced. This we have expressed (in the same work) thus, — 5

This energy cannot take shape,

As long as the result 6 is absent.

so. i. Neither is (the existence of an energy just at the moment of) produc¬ tion possible, because a thing is either produced or not yet produced, there is no existence between (these two moments). It has been said —

What is being produced is not produced,

Because ’tis only half-produced.

Or else all things without exception
Would nascent always be. 7

1 pratyayavati. 2 vijnana-jani-kriya. 3 Read paci-kriya.

4 M. av., VI. 8. 5 Ibid., VI. 19, cp‘ M. vr., p. 545.

c kartra-vina, lit. « without the makers, sc. without the result as maker or shaper of the energy. The future vijnana is here envisaged as the shaper ( karma-lcaraka ) of its own producer.

7 Lit., p. 80. 3-4. « Because the nascent is half-born the nascent is not born. Otherwies the condition of being nascent would attach ( prasajyate) just to everything)).

APPENDIX! CANDRAK1E'ITS COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, I

Since this (assumed) energy cannot be located iu any one of the three so. 5. times (past, present and future), it does not exist altogether. (Nagarjuna) therefore says,

No energies in causes.

We have commented upon this point in our «Madhyamika Intro¬ duction)) when explaining that,

Without something characterized

There can be no characteristic feature, etc . 1

Indeed the (non-existing) son of a barren woman cannot be charac¬ terized as the possessor of a cow, (since he neither did nor does nor will exist). (The non-existing energy cannot appertain to a cause).

But then an energy might perhaps exist (alone) without being tliepos- 80. 9 . sesion of a cause? This is also impossible,

No energy outside the causes.

If there is no energy in the causes, there neither can be any so. 10. outside them, (it would then be) an uncaused energy. If there is no (separate) cloth beside the threads (composing it), this does not mean that the cloth preexists (somewhere else), in some straw 7 . 2 Consequently no energy producing entities does really exist.

If this is the case, if it is impossible to assume energies, then perhaps so. 13. the causes (alone, without possessing any energies will be sufficient) for the production of entities? It is answered,

No causes without energies. so. 15.

If energies do not exist, then the causes will be bereft of energy, they will not be efficient, they will not be causes. How then will they produce something?

But (if causes really) produce something, they must be necessarily so. 17. possessors of energy!

1 Ibid. VI. 57 The possessive relation is here represented in an inverted manner. Instead of speaking of causes or objects possessing energies, the author speaks of energies possessing causes (pratyayarati kriya), he means «belonging to causes».

- vlrana.

81. 2

81. 3 si. e.

81. 8

81. 9

81. 11

82. 1

To this it is answered,

Nor causes are there that possess them.

The 1 existence of energies is thus denied. (It then becomes clear) that causes cannot be possessors of (non-existing) energies.

What has been here said about an energy producing sensation, equally applies to the energy of heat 2 and other (physical energies). Thus the word «production)) is itself devoid of any meaning.

XLIV. Causation is not Coordination.

To this the (Hlnayanist) replies. We are not in the least affected by your examination of the question whether the causes are possessors of energy (or not. We are satisfied with establishing the fact) that entities, such as sensation, arise in a certain coordination with (other entities), 3 e. g., the organ of vision etc. (This is all what we mean, when we assert that the existence of an organ of vision etc. are the conditions under which a visual sensation etc. can arise).

(Nagarjuna) now states that (this coordinational theory of causation) is also wrong,

Y. Let those facts be causes

With whom coordinated other facts arise,

Non-causes will they be

So far the other facts have not arisen.

If sensation is an entity whose origination is coordinated with a faculty of vision and other (conditions), and these coordinates (are called causes), is it not evident that up to the moment when this so called «result®, the sen¬ sation, has really arisen, what can the organs etc. represent but non-causes? They are (as good as) non-causes. That is the idea of (Nagarjuna). And nothing can be produced out of its non-causes, e.#., oil cannot be pressed out of sand corns.

But the following objection is then raised. They begin by being non¬ causes, but they are afterwards converted into causes by combining with

1 Lit., p. 81. 2. aThe word «not» is the connection with the subject-matter, (i. e., the negation must he taken out of the preceding sentence). The word «uta» puts emphasise

2 Read paci-kriyd. 3 pratyaydn pratitya.

appendix: candrakTrtTs comment on relativity, i 171