The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

85. 7. (Nagarjuna) next proceeds to destroy the notion of an immediately preceding (moment of a chain of homogeneous momentary existences which by the Hinayanist is reckoned as a special) condition. 5 He says,

IX. If (separate) elements do not exist,

Nor is it possible for them to disappear.

There is no moment which immediately precedes.
And if it disappears, how can it be a cause?

1 Lit., p. 84.9-10. «This also is impossible, (because it is stated in the aphorism) — ((with¬ out an object really... etc (an existing element is taught (in the system)». Indeed the non-existing has no combination with the object».

2 Lit., p. 85. 4. «The word atha for a question. Why? — for the reason».

3 alatnbanaka. 4 adosa.

5 This condition corresponds roughly to the samavayi-karana of the Nyaya-Vaise§ika, it represents the upadana, the substratum of every appearing element. In the realistic systems the causa materialis is the continuant substance in the new production. But all Buddhists deny appendix: candi;aki rti’s comment on relativity, i 175

The 1 definition of the immediately preceding (homogeneous) condition 86. 4. is here (in the Hinayana) the following one. The immediately preceding destruction of the (material) cause is a condition of the production of the result. The following must be considered. When (in a monistic system) all entities, 2 all (supposed) results, (are viewed) as non-produced, 3 as e. g., a sprout (is not considered as a new origination), 4 then (it is clear that from this standpoint) the disappearance of the cause, the seed (in its last moment), is impossible. In this case, there is no disappearance of the (material) cause, and therefore how can there be (a moment representing) the im¬ mediately preceding condition for the production of the sprout?

But (the Hinayanist) maintains that (all existence being a chain of 86. 7. discrete moments) the disappearance of the seed must have happened before the result has appeared. However if the seed is destroyed, converted into non-existence, what is then (supposed to represent) a cause of the sprout?

Or what is the cause that has destroyed the seed? Both are without a cause. (This is expressed in the words),

And if it disappears, how can it be a cause?

The word «and» refers to a non-produced (sprout). 5 Indeed, since it is as- 86. 9 . sumed that the sprout is not yet produced at (the moment) when the seed has already disappeared, both these events (the disappearing of the seed and the appearing of the sprout) are without a cause. For this reason an immedi¬ ately foregoing separate momentary (existence as a cause) is an impossibility.

Another explanation of this verse is the following one. 86. io.

(In the first aphorism of this treatise, viz.—

There absolutely are no things,

Nowhere and none, that arise anew), the existence of continuant substances and reduce them to chains of discrete moments, every preceding moment representing the upadana of the following one. The preceding moment is supposed to have vanished when the next one appears.

1 Precedes a grammatical explanation. Lit., p. 86.1-3. « Here, in the. last half of the verse, the quarters must be transposed. Moreover the word «and» is at the wrong place, it should stand after the word niruddhe. The reading will then be, «if it has disappeared, how is it a cause? Therefore «the foregoing)) is not admissible)). It has been thus expressed for the sake of versification ».

2 dharma. 3 i. e. existing sub specie aeternitotis

4 but as a mode of the unique substance (tathdtd = dharmakdya) of the Universe.

5 It is the habit of Indian commentaries to interpret the particle «and» as an indication of some additional circumstance.

Neither out of themselves, nor out of non-self,

Nor out of both, nor at random,

(the notion) of «origination)) has been cleared away (altogether).

(The present aphorism simply) refers to that (general denial and draws the consequence that —)

If (separate) elements never appear,

Nor is it possible for them to disappear.

There is no moment which immediately precedes . 1

86 . 14. As to the explanation (of the last sentence of the aphorism, viz.)

And if it disappears, how can it be a cause? it remains then just the same as before.

XLVI1I. The special cause also denied.

so. 17. (Nagarjuna) now goes on to deny the existence of a predominant condition 2 and says,

X. If entities are relative , 3

They have no real existence.

The formula «this being, that appears»

Then loses every meaning.

87. i. The definition of the predominant condition 4 is here in (Hlnay ana) the follow¬ ing one. A predominant condition is that(special) fact which beingpresent the re-

1 i. e., there is no momentary existence which immediately disappears in order to make room for the next moment