The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

of a drum) and the above mentioned (designation of sense-perception instead of object-perception). If sensation be specified according to its object, (one could specify) our sensations as colour-sensations etc. (But we could not specify in this way) all the six kinds of sensations, since mental (or intel¬ lectual) sensation (is a sixth kind of sensation) which is apprehending the

73 . l. same object simultaneously (with the external sense). Indeed, if we include in the term sensation all its six varieties, beginning with the visual ones (and including the intellectual ones), we might be quite uncertain what to think when someone would mention the term (visual) sensation. (We will not know) whether it means only the sensation produced by the external sense, or it is meant to include the corresponding internal sensation, (the mental reaction) 4

73. 2 . also. But if we specify sensations according to (the organ) in which they are lodged, although mental sensation can refer to (the same) object to which visual and other sensations (likewise refer), nevertheless their mutual distinc¬ tion will, in that case, be clearly established. (If they were called accor¬ ding to their object, since the object can be the same when different sensa¬ tions are meant, confusion would arise).

73. 4. However, in this case you are merely concerned with giving a defini¬ tion of what the sources of our knowledge are. You accordingly assume that sense-knowledge is simply that kind of knowledge where all constructive thought is brushed aside, (it is pure passive sensation). 5 Just the contrast with thought

1 Ab. Kosa, I. 45.

2 Lit., p. 72.5—7. «Thus although it exists with reference to every object, nevertheless it will be (sense) perception, because, existing as lodged in every sense-organ, sensation is desi¬ gnated by its residence ».

3 niladi-vijnana. ± mdnasn.

5 kalpanapodha is the celebrated definition of Dignaga discussed almo t in every

Indian philosophical work. It makes a difference between the first moment in every perception is in your opinion its characteristic. No purpose is served by naming (its varieties) according to their specific causes. 1 Now, the number of the sources of our knowledge (exactly) corresponds to the number of the cognized (cate¬ gories of existence). You have established the character of both your sources 73 . 6. of knowledge in strict correspondence with the double character of the cognizable. (To this strict correspondence) they owe their existence and their shape. You should, therefore, remain always faithful to your principle of de¬ signating cognitiou only according to its object. To name it according to the organ of sense would serve no purpose (from your standpoint). 2

However (the Logician may vindicate his interpretation by the follow- 73. 8 ing consideration). The word sense-perception is generally known to everyone.

The word object-perception is not used as a designation of what we here have in ourmnid. For this reason we adhere to the interpretation that the term senseperception means perception (through the sense-organs), through the place where the sensations are lodged, (it does not mean the perceived object).

The Madhyamika answers. (This is true), the word perception is very 74. i. well known in common life, and we, (not you), are using it just in what seuse it is used in common life. 3 (Your) interpretationisma.de with utter disregard ot what is established as real in common life. Generally known (in your interpretation) is only the utter disregard of what is (really) generally known, it is then pure sensation, it is passive, involving absolutely no thought-construction. But the next step, which is also perception, represents the construction of an image by synthetic thought (vikalpenn anugamyate). The distinction has a great importance for Dignaga, because bethinks that in this pure sensation, this, so to say, oreine Sinnlichkeit», the «pure object » (SuddJw-artlia), the «thing in itself» (svalaksana) reveals itself to our consciousness. Itisinteresting to compare the controversy between Eberhard and Kant on a similar question. Eberhard assumed that he was opposing Kant when he maintained that the ((thing in itself» reveals itself in our sensations (Emfindungen ), but Kant conceded the point, «nun ist das eben (viz. dass die Dingean sick der Sinnlichkeitihren Stoff geben) die bestimdige Bekauptung der Kritik», cp. Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der etc., p. 35 (Kirchmann).

1 Lit.. 73.4—6. «But here, with a view to express the essence of the sources of cognition ( pramana), tbeabsence of synthesis (kalpana) alone is admitted as perception, because the pecu¬ liarity of this (mode of cognition) is found (in its difference) from constructive (dichotomizing, vikalpaka ) cognitiou; by naming it according to its special (cause) no usefulness is indicated)).