The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

1 Lit., p. 70.9. «Because there is no substratum for what is being metaphored». In the first case the really existing sense-data were the substratum, and the physical object jar superimposed upon them. It was answered that you cannot superimpose a thing you nowhere have perceived. In the second the relation has been reversed and it is supposed that the non-existing jar is the substratum upon which the sense-data are superimposed. This is still less possible.

3 Lit., 70.11 ((there is no blue etc. beyond earth etc.».

3 Catuhsataka, XIV.14.

4 Lit., p. 71.2. «Just so there is no colour beyond wind etc.». Earth, wind etc. are the 4 fundamental elements of Matter ( maha-lhuta) which are cognized exclusively by touch, (spastavyadyatana), thus colour (rupn-ayatana) is here reduced to a tactile phenomenon. Cp.the contention of modern empiricism which reduces our notion of Matter to sense-data and the sense-data to the one fundamental sensation of resistance. About Matter offering resistance ( sapratighatva) to sight, cp. Ah. Kosabh. ad I. 29.

5 lattva-vid-apeksaya. 0 taltva-vid.

appendix: candrakirti’s comment on relativity, i 159

His sovereign mind will equally deny
The soft, the fragrant and the sweet. 1

There is however (another explanation of what perception really means). 71 . 10 . The word perception simply means a thing which is not beyond the range of our senses, (it does not mean its cognition through our senses). An object which is present and faces us is thus called a perception. 2 Jars, patches of blue colour and similar physical objects are called perceptions when they are not beyond the range of sight. A perception thus means an object which has been approached 3 by our senses. The corresponding definite cognition is (also) called perception (by a metaphor), because it is the cause which makes the object evident, just as we speak of a «straw fire» or «husk fire» (metapho¬ rically, instead of saying fire producing burning straw or burning husk).

There is a philosopher 4 who has given the following interpretation of 72 . 1 . the term perception. (Perception is that kind of knowledge which) exists in close connenction with each sense faculty. (This could also mean that sense knowledge is a knowledge about the senses, a knowledge whose objects are the senses). This interpretation is wrong, because sense-perception is not a knowledge about the senses, it is a knowledge about the object 5 of (the senses). (If his interpretation were correct, we would speak not of sense perception), but of «object -perception)) or of «thing-perception».

Be it as the case may be, we find in (the Abhidharmakosa) the 72 . 4 . following explanation. Sensation 6 is produced by a double cause, (the sense faculty and its object). Nevertheless it receives its name only through (one of its causes, the organ) in which the corresponding sense faculty is lodged, because sensation changes in degree, according to the changes by

1 Catuhsataka, XIII. 1—2.

2 The origin of this definition— pratyaksam aparoksani ((perception is the object not beyond our ken», can he traced in the Brh. ar. Upanisad, III. 4. 1 and III.5.1. It is adopted in the later scholastic Vedanta, cp. Vedanta-paribhaga, p. 12 (Bombay 1900, Venkatesvar). It is also mentiontioned by Udayana, Parisuddhi, p. G47 (B. I.). It seems probable that the Madhyamikas have borrowed it from the Vedantins. To the Madhyamikas it suggested the omni¬ presence of Buddha’s dharma-kaya , just as to the Vedantins it suggested the omnipresence of /iparoksam brahma cognized by mystic intuition. Cp. above, p. 45.

3 Lit., p. 71.10-11. «By meaning «in it the sense is approached», the perceptibility of jars, blue etc., not being beyond the ken, is established ».

4 The definition of Prasastapada is here alluded to, cp. Prasastp., p. 186.12. The etymological explanation of the Naiyayikas does not differ materially, cp. Nyavavart., p. 30.4. Nyayabindut., p. 6. 4, makes a difference between the etymology and the real meaning.

5 visaya-visaya. 6 vijnana.

APPENDIX: OANDRAKlHTI’S COMMENT OX RELATIVITY, I

NIRVANA

which the faculty may be affected. 1 To sharp or feeble faculties correspond (sharp or feeble) sensations. We then have visual and other sensations. Thus, although a perception changes with every object, 2 nevertheless it receives its name according to the place where it is lodged. It exists as lodged in different sense organs, it is thus sense-perception, (not object-perception). It is customary to name a thing by its specific cause, e. g., the sound «of a drum» (although it is also the sound of the sticks), the sprout «of barley» (although it is also the sprout of the soil etc.).

72 . 8. Madhyamika. There is no analogy between (the example of the sound