The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

2 Lit., p. 73.6—8. «And since the existence of the number of the sources of cognition is dependent upon the objects of cognition, and because the essence of (such) two sources of cogni¬ tion has been established which have attained their shape ( atmabhava) and existence ( satta ) exclusively by conforming to the (double) form of the cognizable, the designation through the sense-organ helps nothing; thus in every respect the designation just by the object is the right one».

3 pratyaksa means also an object «evident)), ((present .».

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A I-'PENDIXI CANDliAKIKTl’S COMMENT ON RELATIVITY. I

NIKVANA

because (in your interpretation, as pure sensation), it would not even mean perception. 1

74. 3. And moreover, since you give to the term a generalizing sense (of what is present in all sensations), the case (of a single moment) of visual sensation, which is produced by a single moment of the faculty of vision, will not be covered (by your definition). And then, if a single moment of perception will thus (according to this definition) not be perception, neither will a number of them be perception. 2

74. c. Now, you maintain that sense*perception is only that kind of cognition which is quite free from any participation in it of constructive thought. However with such (pure sensation alone) you will not be able to converse with your fellow beings. Nevertheless you pretend to analyse the course which cognition and its object take in common life. It follows that that sort of sense-knowledge which you assume (sc. pure sensation) is quite useless.

74 . 8. Madhyamika. (You are also vindicating your theory of perception by referring to Scripture where it is stated that) «a man, having a visual sen¬ sation (of a patch of blue colour) apprehends blue, but does not know that it is blue», (the definite knowledge is produced by a subsequent operation of contrasting blue with not blue). 3 (But in our opinion this scriptural delive-

1 Lit., p. 74.3. «...well known could be (your) distortion ( tiraskara j of the term «well known » and therefore it would not be thus sense-perception». The pratyaksa in Dignaga’s and Dharmaklrti’s interpretation, meaning as it does a moment of pure, undifferentiated sensation, represents, indeed, something quite unknown in common life. The divergence between the com¬ mon idea of perception and Dignaga’s conception of pure sensation is much more considerable than the divergence between it and the Madhyamika-Vedanta definition of perception as the thing perceived, since the Sanskrit term for perception pratyaksa is a word very commonly used in the sense of a thing present, evident, perceived. Dharmottara himself calls that kind of pure perception which is imagined by Buddhists something «hardly existing» asat-Jcalpa, cp. Ryaya-bindut., p. 16. 6. This retort of the Madhyamika is, nevertheless, not quite fair, be¬ cause the follower of Dignaga, when maintaining that perception is not the object, but its cogni¬ tion, does not refer to pure sensation, but to perceptive cognition which includes a moment of sensation.

2 Lit., p. 74.3-4. «And there will be no perception-character (pratyaksatva) of one visual sensation (caksur-vijfianasya) possessing an underlying (aSrayasya) single moment of the sense-faculty (indriya-ksana), because of the absence of the meaning of generalization (vipsa)».

in his Pramana-samuccaya-vrtti. I. 4, as a quotation from the abhidharma ( chos-mnon-pa-las )

3 This very important text from an unknown agama is mentioned already by Dignaga

in support of his theory. This could prove that Dignaga’s theory of pure sensation was fore¬ shadowed in previous Sautrantika works. Kamalasila examines it at length in his Nyaya-bindupurva-paksa-sankgipti (Bstan-hgyur, Mdo CXI, f. 112 ff). Vasubandhu’s definition of pratyaksa is quite different, cp. Pramana-samuccaya I, 15, and Nyiiyavart, p. 42.

ranee is not meant to give any definition of sense-perception. It only is meant to notify that the sensations of the five external sense-organs (alone, without the participation of a conscious element), remain unconscious. Sensa¬ tion which is absolutely bare of every element of (synthetic) thought cannot be maintained to represent perception, even on the basis of Scrip¬ ture. This would be wrong.

Therefore from the empirical, 1 (not from the transcendental), point of 75 . 2 . view, everything without exception is called present, 2 (i. e., a perception), when it is directly perceived (by the senses), whether it be (your strictly) particular essence or the general essence or the thing 3 (possessing these both essences). A perception is thus determined (as meaning) the object of per¬ ception together with its cognition. 4 The double moon and similar illusions will not be sense - perceptions, if compared with the cognitions of a man with a normal capacity of vision, but for the man suffering from ophtalmia it will be just Ms sense-perception.

As regads cognition of objects lying beyond the range of our senses, it 75 . g. is produced by a (perceived) mark which is invariably concomitant with them.

It is called inference.