The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

1 Read pravrttita. C. is here playing with the double meaning of icclm, «desire» aud «tenet >>. «Your behaviour is bound (by such theories as are) merely (fantastical) desires », i.e. you are uot acting in accordance with your tenets, if speech is only apoha you ought not to speak at all«.

2 The definition here alluded to is Dignaga’s definition, «sense-perception is quite free from all synthetic operation of thought (7 tdpandpodhr^. cp X >'ey n bindu. p. 6. 15.

3 an-drya , tbe non-Saint. The Buddhist Saint, l;c:::g a pl.il or who has < hanged all usual habits of thought, directly realizes that what lie perceives are only momentary sense-data,

The Logician. It might have been (wrong, but for the following con- 70. 1. siderations). Perceived are directly the sense data, e.g., a patch of dark colour etc. They make up the physical object, the jar. Sense perception, as a source of knowledge, distinguishes (only that). (But tbe cognition of the physical object which is a mental construction resulting from sense-perception)is likewise called sense-perception by a metaphor. Such metaphors we find inScripture, e. g, when it is stated that «the advent of Buddhas is a weal», (instead of stating that it 'produces weal). We impute to the cause what really belongs to the effect. Just so, by a (converse) metaphor, from the cause to the effect, we say that (the physical object), the jar, is perceived, while only its causes, the sense data, are really perceived. 1

Madhyamika. To assume a (natural) metaphor in such cases (as the 70 . s. perception of a jar) is impossible. (Quite different is the case of the advent of a Buddha). Indeed a birth, (i.e. the process of a birth), is held in ordinary life as the reverse of pleasure. (It is not the blissful Quiescence of the Forces of life). It is essentially produced through the cooperation of a plurality of biotic forces. 2 It is a cause of very much pain. (By itself) it is anything but a weal. Nevertheless it is (here) called a weal. There is a contradiction. 3 In such cases we assume a metaphor. (The advent of a Buddha, although also painful by itself, is nevertheless a weal, because it produces the weal of Quiescence in Nirvana). The case is different with a perceived jar. We have no fcuch separate thing as an invisible jar which could he called perceived metaphorically.

The Logician. (On the contrary!) Just because there is no jar over 70. 8 . and above the corresponding sense-data, it is convenient to maintain that its perceptibility is a metaphor.

Madhyamika. If you take it so, the metaphor is still less possible, 70 . 8—9. because the object which you metaphorically endow (with perceptibility) does the remainder is construction. Dignaga’s definition may be a right description of his percep¬ tion, but will not cover the usual view.

1 Lit., p. 70.1-3.« But let it be! The blue etc., the substratum of the jar, are evident, since they are being determined by perceptive cognitiou. Hence just as by imputing the effect to the cause it is said that the birth of Buddha is agreeable, thus the jar, although its causes are tbe evi¬ dent blue etc., by imputing the cause to the effect, is called a perception)).

2 samskrta-laksana-svabhava. «it has the essence of the forces of lifea, about tbe four forces ( samskara ) which are called saniskrta-laksana cp. my Central Conception, p. 39. There is no other weal for tbe Buddhist as the Quiescence i. e. extinction of all life in an Absolute.

3 asambaddha eva.

70. 10.

71. 1.

71. 3.

71. 6.

not exist at all. You cannot speak about the sharpness of the horns on the head of the donkey even metaphorically. 1 Moreover if you assume that the jar which is a part of our every-day experience is perceived by us in a metapho¬ rical sense, because there is no such jar over and above the sense-datum of a dark patch of colour etc., then (you are bound to take the next step and condemn this patch of dark colour as well), since it also does not exist over and above the sense-datum of something resistent. 2 Then, please, assume that the patch of dark colour is also perceived in a metaphorical sense! This has been expressed in the following verse, 3 —

Just as there is no jar
Beyond its colour,

Just so there is no colour
Beyond resistance. 4

Therefore this and similar usual expressions are not covered by your definition of perception. It is quite deficient, (since it does not cover the whole of its subject matter). Now, from the transcendental point of view, 5 we equally condemn the perception of (the physical object), the jar, as well as the perception of (the sense data), blue etc. On the contrary, from the empi¬ rical view' of every-day life, we must admit that the jar is perceived. This has been expressed in one of the four hundred verses (of Aryadeva) in the following manner.

A transcendantalist 6 will never say —

«We see (a patch) of colour, not a jar»,

Or «a jar is present (before us)».

In following just this line of argument