The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

6 Solidity ( Jcharatva) is the essence (laksana) of the solid bodies. All the work of predica¬ tion being relative, it can, from this point of view, be maintained that the solid body is not solid, sc. is not solid by itself, but only in relation to others. This is a case of the laksana-nihsva - bhavata, or Sunyata, cp. Triinsika, p. 32. For Candrakjrti it is enough to point out this general conception in order to establish the relativity and consequent unreality of the idea of a solid stuff. But Bhavaviveka wishes apparently to construct a formal syllogism on the same basis as the first one, i. e., he finds a contradiction in the sentence «a solid stuff is a stuff» na the score that there are stuffs that are liquid and gazeous. These three syllogisms are cele¬ brated among Tibetan schoolmen as baffling arguments establishing Relativity ( Sunyatd ) accor¬ ding to the system of the Svatantrikas founded by Bhavaviveka.

7 Cp. above, p. 26.1, sattvdt — vidyamanatvat.

appendix: candrakirti’s comment on relativity, i 117 that they exist eternally 1 like the Spirit 2 exists, or whether the words ((because they already exist» refer to that kind of origination which is exemplified by the origination of jars and'Other (physical existence in ge¬ neral, an origination which represents a change in a permanent stuff, since according to this system mental changes are in themselves phy¬ sical). 3

It may be objected (that the adduced example, the identity of matter 33. 5. in physical objects) like jars etc., is a petitio principii* and therefore the argument is not uncertain, (but wrong). 5 However this is not so, because the argument is stated not in conformity (with our view, but from the stand¬ point of the Sankhya, where mental phenomena indeed have a double nature, they are physical in themselves and at the same time they are the reflection of the eternal changeless Spirit).

XXIV. The Madhyamika repudiates his opponent on principles admitted as valid by the same opponent.

But it may be objected that our own argument will then be liable to 34. 1. just the same criticism which we apply to the arguments of our opponents.

(All our arguments will be also wrong, because) the reasons (which will be adduced) will either be non-entities (themselves), or they will represent something appertaining to a non-entity. When both parties are guilty of the same fault, it cannot be charged to the account of one of them alone.

All this our attack (on logic) will thus become unfounded.

To this we reply. This objection affects only those who (being Madh- 34. 4. yamikas, nevertheless, like Bhavaviveka), have recourse to bona fide arguments. 6 But we do not resort to direct proof by syllogism. Our argu¬ ments can have only the result of repudiating the tenets of our opponents,

(for us they are not valid by themselves).

1 Lit., «should not arise », i. e. not change. The spirit of the Sankhya is changeless.

2 caitanya.

3 Lit., p. 33. 4-5. «Because they exist, this reason is uncertain, what? should the (six)

internal bases (of cognition), because they exist like the Spirit, not arise out of self, or like jars etc., they should arise out of self?»

4 sadhya-sama.

appendix: candrakIrti’s comment on RELATIVITY. I nirvana

5 not anaikantika , but asiddha , cp. Nyayabindu, p. 62.

6 svatantra-anwmana.

34. 6. Supposing someone maintains that «the eye perceives external ob¬ jects». He will then be repudiated on principles which lie himself admits. You maintain, (lie will be told), that the eye lacks the capacity of introspection 1 which, in your opinion, is invariably concomitant with the capacity of apprehending external objects.

Now, (we will assail it by a counter-argument).

(Major premise). Wheresoever introspection is absent, cognition of ex¬ ternal objects is also absent.

(Example). E. g., (in physical objects) like jars etc.

(Minor premise). The eye lacks the capacity of introspection, (it is physical).

(Conclusion). Therefore it cannot cognize external objects.

3-i. 9. Thus it is that the perception of an external object like (a patch of) blue colour is in conflict with the fact that the eye itself is deficient in self-perception. This contradiction (in the argument of our opponent) has been disclosed by another argument which is valid from (the stand¬ point of the opponent) himself.

34. n. This alone is elicited by our syllogism. How is then the above men¬ tioned accusation possible? How can it be maintained (that our deduction contains) the same flaw (which we have found in the argument of our op¬ ponent?

XXY. Logical refutation on the basis of facts admitted by only

ONE PARTY.

34. 13. (Bhavaviveka). (It is true that for us Monists all individual facts possess no reality). However (a discussion is possible) even then when an argument is combated on the basis of principles admitted by one of the parties.