The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

7 Among all considerations which tend to undermine our usual conceptions of causation this one is considered by the Tibetans to be the strongest, they say it is as solid as diamond.

* p. 37. 2 read sadhana-dusanantah . .., i. e. ity asya sadhanasya dusana -

p. 121

(we will have the following argument), «since everything must arise out of something (and the origination out of non-self is rejected), entities must then arise either out of themselves or out of self and non-self combined, or without a cause, otherwise (really) everything would arise out of anything)).

It is not nonsense ! 1 We have shown above (that a deductio ad ab- 37 . 4 surdurn is a valid proof). As to the accusation that (Buddhapalita) in con¬ futing the tenet of his opponent . 2 has (indirectly) invalidated (his ow r n ) 3 previously established point, it is trivial . 4 We will not again take pains to refute this!

XXVII. Combined causality denied.

Neither do the entities arise out of both (a continuant stuff and se- 38. 1 parate factors), since all the incongruity attaching to each of these hypo¬ theses separately, will then attach (to their combination).

(But then both causes may perhaps work alternately, not simultane¬ ously? No,) since if they are not fit to produce something separately, (they neither will be fit to produce something alternately). Indeed it will be stated later on that—

The world 5 could be a product 38. 3

From a double (set of causes),

If separately they were efficient . 0

XXVIII. No PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE WITHOUT CAUSATION.

But neither can (the saparate entities of this world) arise without a 38. 4 cause. The incongruities which would follow on such an assumption will be pointed out later on, where it will be said,

1 p. 37.4 read with the Tibetan asamgatartham ndsti.

2 The Vaisesika who maintains parata utpatti.

3 sc. paradusanena svadusandntahpatitam.

4 Lit., p. 37.4-7. « And that he has fallen into a refutation by refuting the thesis of the opponent, this is anything (but truth)», i. e., by denying causation between independent sub¬ stances Buddhapalita has indirectly admitted causation out of the same substance — this argument is worth nothing.

5 duhkha , cp. above p. 55 n. 3 e M. s., XII. 9.

38. 5.

38. 7.

38. 10.

38. 12.

39. 5.

If there be no causation,

(All difference) will vanish
Between a cause and its effect. 1

(In our «Introduction to the Madhyamika System») we have also indi¬ cated the following incongruity,

Nothing at all could we perceive
In a universe devoid of causes,

It would be like the colour and the scent
Of a lotus growing in the sky. 2

The Master Buddhapalita comments. Entities, (says he,) neither can arise without a cause, since everything would then be possible at any time, and in any place».

This also has been assailed by Bhavaviveka. (He says), «this is again a mere deductio ad absurdum and it can be turned into the contrary, if the meaning of the argument be disclosed by taking the counterpart of the reason and of the predicate. (You say ((entities are not without a cause, since otherwise everything could appear at any time and at any place». I say) ((entities must have a cause, since everything springs up at a definite time and in a definite place, and because (as experience proves) efficient causes produce (new) results)). Therfore the comment (of Buddhapalita on this point) is wrong, because it contains the same misconception (as his com¬ ment on the foregoing points).

(As) opponents 3 (we will repeat) that this criticism misses the mark.
Its refutation has been made above.

XXIX. Causality through the will of God.

(It may be supposed that this critique of the usual notion of causality is intended) in order to introduce God or similar (transcendental supreme causes). But this is also impossible, because God must be included in one of the alternatives discussed, according to the idea we entertain (about his essence). He is either immanent in the world, or transcends it, or he is both (simultaneously immanent and transcendent).

p. 4

2 M. av., VI. 100.

3 The same use of the term apara as above, text p. 9.6.

APrENDIX: CANDEAKIR'JTS COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, I 123

Thus (it is established that) there is no causality (in the ultimate sense).

The Dependent Origination (or Relativity) with its (eight) characteristics of no real origination etc. is thus established.

XXX. Mahayana and Hinayana contrasted.

An objection is here raised (by the Hmayanist). If it is so, (he says), 39. 8 . if your interpretation of the principle of Dependent Origination (as a prin¬ ciple of Relativity) involving that there is no (real) Causality (is correct), how are the deliverances of the Buddha (to be explained which run against such a theory? Indeed it has been declared),

1. «The forces 1 of life are influenced (in this world) by illusion (and 39. 9 . desire). When illusion (and all desires) have been suppressed (in Nirvana), these forces are extinct)). 2 (This suggests the reality of the force of illu¬ sion and of Nirvana).

2 . All elements 3 of life, 39 . 11.

They (all) appear and disappear;

As soon as they appear they vanish.

Their (final) stoppage is the (only) bliss.

And further,