The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

kirti denies the capacity of the yogi to perceive the ultimately real.

appendix: candrakIrtTs comment on relativity, i 115

(The reason adduced is the same as in the foregoing syllogism, viz.) 32. 5. ((because they produce purposive actions directed to the same objects (as his thoughts have been directed to»). In this argument, (says Bhavaviveka), the reason does not represent a real fact (from the transcendental point of view).

It is moreover (unreal, says he), because motion does not exist. 1 Since 32. c. there is no (real) causation, (motion cannot exist)». 2

Now this method (by which Bhavaviveka here combats the argu- 32. 7. ment of his opponent can be mutatis nmtandis ) applied to his own deductions (which he produces bona fide , viz.),

(Thesis). The future does not exist in an absolute sense. 3

(Reason). Because it represents time. 4

(Example). Just as the past time (does not exist).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is «time» does not represent an ultimate reality).

(To this syllogism we may likewise) apply (the stricture) that the 32. e reason a time» represents nothing real (to the author of the syllogism) himself.

(The student will be now able) himself to extend (the critique here ex- 33. 2 pounded) upon the unreality of the reasons (adduced by Bhavaviveka in the following three syllogisms).

1 . (Thesis). The operating 5 sense of vision does not perceive colour. 32. 9

(Reason). Because it is a sense of vision (in general).

(Example). Just as a non-operating 6 (sense of vision always is).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is a sense of vision does not necessarily perceive colour). 7

1 In Hlnayana motion is denied ( na gatir naMt, Ab. Kosa, IV. 1) since it represents iu reality a series of separate momentary productions ( nirantara-utpada ), as in a cinema. In Mahayana motion is denied because all these moments are relative (svabhava-Sunya).

2 Lit., p. 32. 3-7. «Just as he has said when eliciting the unreality (asiddharthatd) of this reason given by an opponent, viz. ((internal facts ( bhavah ) are necessarily (exm) produced, since they produce actions characterized as possessing their objects)); now it is being proved that «for the meditating Yogi who by his eye of wisdom sees the real pith of existence ( bhdva - ydthatmya), origination, motion etc. exist in the absolute sense (paramarthatah), then there is unreality of the reason, because they produce actions characterized as possessing their objects, and motion is denied just because origimation is denied. Just so...»

3 Lit., aThe not-run is not at all being run in the absolute sense».

4 adhvan.

5 Read sabhagam instead of saSrayam. Sabhaga — sva -karma-lift, cp. A. Kosa, I. 39-

6 tatsabhdga = a-sva-karma-krt, cp. Ab. Kosa, 1.39.

7 For the Monist, according to Candrakirti, it would have been sufficient to deny a real perception of colour on the score that all separate facts have no ultimate reality for a cou-

8 *

116 nirvana

33. i. 2 . (Thesis). The organ of vision does not apprehend colours.

(Reason). Because it is physical . 1

(Example). Just as any physical object , 2 (e. g., a jar etc.).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is physical does not apprehend colours ). 3

33. 2. 3 . (Thesis). The solid bodies 4 do not really possess solidity.

(Reason). Because they represent Matter . 5

(Example). Just as the gazeous bodies.

(Major premise. Whatsoever is Matter is not always a solid body ). 6

XXIII. Another formal error in the syllogism of Bhavaviveka.

33. 4. Moreover the reason «because they (sc. mental phenomena) exist » 7 is «uncertain» from the standpoint of the opponent. (The syllogism of Bhavavi¬ veka is directed against the Sankhya who admits a double kind of exis¬ tence, the eternal, changeless existence of the Spirit and the changing existence of Matter. It is therefore uncertain) whether the words '<mental phenomena do not arise out of themselves because they already exist» mean sequent Monist, or only a second hand reality (paratantra) for a Yogacara, cp. above p. 33. But Bhavaviveka apparently tries to corroborate this view by something like a formally correct syllogism. He seemingly has detected in the judgment «the eye is a colour-perceiving organ» the same contradiction as really appears if the copula be taken in the sense of an equation. The eye thus does not perceive colour because it does not always perceive it, perception is not its essence (svabhava) as, e. g., the quality of being resistent is the essence of the hard stuff.

1 bhautika.

2 rupa, the first rupa = rupa-dyatana, the second probably --- rupa-skundha.

3 Here Bhavaviveka has recourse to an idea of the i^yaya-Vaise§ika school (bhautikani indriyani) in order to undermine the fact that colours are perceived through the eye. According to Candraklrti this is quite superfluous for a believer in Universal Relativity $unyata=nihsvabhavata), and moreover constitutes a fault in formal logic, since the reason, the physical character ( bhautika ) of the organ, has no real force from the point of view of the author of the syllogism, it is asiddha svatah.

4 mahl—prthim , cp. my Central Cone., p. 13.

5 bhuta=maha-bhuta, cp. ibid. 99.