The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

31. i. (He examines the following syllogism).

(Thesis.) The causes and (conditions) which produce mental phenomena 5 really exist.

(Reason.) Because this has been declared by Buddha.

(Major premise). Whatsoever has been declared by the Buddha is true . 6

(Example). As e. g., (his statement) that Nirvana is (Final) Quies¬ cence.

si. 3. This syllogism has been advanced by a (Hinayanist) opponent of (Bhavaviveka). He replies by the following criticism. «In what sense, do you think, the word «cause» is here used? Has Buddha spoken from the phenomenal point of view or from the transcendental 7 one? If it is taken in the phenomenal sense, the reason has (eo ipso ) no (ultimate) reality for (Buddha) himself. But supposing it is taken in the sense of something transcendentally real, (then we must remember the following words of N agarj uDa),

1 Sunyata-vadin.

2 aSunyata-vadin.

3 The argument, namely, that for a consistent Monist every separate thing and every se¬ parate reason is ultimately unreal.

4 tarkika.

5 adhyatmika-ayatana.

6 Lit., «Indeed what (and) how is taught by the Buddha (to exist), is so».

7 paramarthatah.

Neither an Ens, nor a non-Ens,

Nor any Ens-non-Ens,

No element 1 is really ((turned out». 2

How can we then assume

The possibility of a producing 3 cause ?

«Since causation 4 of things, whether real or unreal or (partly) real 31. 7. and (partly) unreal, is excluded, there is no such thing as a (really) efficient 31. 9. cause». This is the meaning of the words (of Nagarjuna).

((Therefore from the transcendental point of view 5 there is altogether 31. 9. no efficient causality. 6 Every reason (you may adduce) will be either (ulti¬ mately) unreal or contradictory)).

By adopting this line of argument (against the Hinayanist, Bhavavi- 31. 11. veka) has himself admitted the unreality of every reason (from the trans¬ cendental standpoint of the Relativist). Thus all logical demonstrations are smashed, since in all such syllogisms reasons are adduced which (in the opinion of the opponent) are founded on real fact, but in the opinion of (the Relativist) himself they are all (ultimately) unreal. 7

In the following (two syllogisms of Bhavaviveka the middle term 31. is. must likewise be declared faulty, on the score that it is meaningless from the Monist’s transcendental point of view). E. g.,

(Thesis). Mental phenomena 8 do not really 9 arise from corresponding causes, separate from them.

(Reason). Because these are separate (entities).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is a separate substance cannot really be a cause).

1 dharma.

- nirvartyate.

3 nirvartaka.

4 sad-asat-karya-pratyayatva, i. e., neither satkarya- nor asatkarya-vada is admitted.

5 paramarthatah.

6 nirvartya-nirvartakatva.

7 Lit., p. 31. 11-13. aSince thus be even himself by this method has admitted the un¬ reality of the reason, therefore in all syllogisms which have middle terms suggested by attributes of real entities, since just by themselves reasons etc. are unreal, just all demonstrations are killed.®

* adhyatmika-ayatana , lit.. «the (six) subjective bases (of cognition)®.

9 paramarthatah.

31. 14

32. I

32. 3

32. 4

p. 114

(Example). As the causes of ajar 1 (which are not real in the ab¬ solute sense).

Or (another example),

(Thesis). The causes which, iu the opinion of our opponents, 2 produce mental phenomena 3 are not understood to be causes in the absolute sense.

(Reason). Because they are separate (entities).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is a separate entity is not a cause in the absolute sense).

(Example). As e. g., the threads, (the loom, the weaver etc. are not the causes of cloth from the transcendental point of view).

The reason ((because they are separate (entities))) is not a valid middle term, since (for the author of these syllogisms) himself it has no (ultimate) reality.

Another example where (Bhavaviveka implicitly admits that the transcendentalist has to forego usual logical methods, is the following one). He is desirous to elicit that the reason given by his opponent (the Sautrantika) is wrong, because it represents a fact whose (ultimate) reality he, (as a consequent Relativist), does not accept. (The argument of the Sautrantika runs thus).

(Thesis). Internal facts 4 (i. e., mental phenomena) really arise (i.e., they have a real existence).

(Reason). Because they produce purposive actions directed towards the same objects as (our thoughts have been directed to).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is efficient is real).

(Bhavaviveka repudiates this conclusion by quoting the following paral¬ lel argument),

(Thesis). The Yogi, when merged in transic meditation, perceives by his supernatural faculty of vision the ultimate reality, he then apprehends cau¬ sation, motion etc. as they really are. 0

1 Read ghatasya.

2 Read paraih instead of pare.

3 Lit., «The (six) subjective bases (of cognition), the faculty of sight (caksuh) etc.».

4 adhyatmika bhavah.

5 The definition of reality ( paramartha-sat ) as efficiency (artha-kriya-haritva) is ac¬ cepted by Dignaga and Dharmakirti, cp. Nyayabindu. p. 13. 15. It is also shared by the Sautrantikas, cp. N. b. Tipp., p. 19.

6 In the Santanantara-siddhi, §90 (B. B. XI), Russian transl. p. 47, Dharma¬