The Enneads — trans. Stephen MacKenna

rative organ always in active posture ; this is to convey that the generator of things of sense is the Intellectual Reason Principle : the sterility of Matter, eternally unmoved, is indicated by the eunuchs surrounding it in its representation as the All-Mother.

This too exalting title is conferred upon it in order to indicate that it is the source of things in the sense of being their underlie : it is an approximate name chosen for a general conception ; there is no intention of suggesting a complete parallel with motherhood to those not satisfied with a surface impression but needing a precisely true presentment ; by a remote symbolism, the nearest they could find, they indicate that Matter is sterile, not female to full effect, female in receptivity only, not in pregnancy : this they accomplish by exhibiting Matter as approached by what is neither female nor effectively male, but castrated of that impregnating power which belongs only to the unchangeably masculine.

I.

Eternity and Time ; two entirely separate things, we explain “ the one having its being in the everlasting Kind, the other in the realm of Process, in our own Universe ” ; and, by continually using the words and assigning every phenomenon to the one or the other category, we come to think that, both by instinct and by the more detailed attack of thought, we hold an adequate experience of them in our minds without more ado.

When, perhaps, we make the effort to clarify our ideas and close

III. 7. 2]

into the heart of the matter we are at once unsettled : our doubts throw us back upon ancient explanations ; we choose among the various theories, or among the various interpretations of some one theory, and so we come to rest, satisfied, if only we can counter a question with an approved answer, and glad to be absolved from further enquiry.

Now, we must believe that some of the venerable philosophers of old discovered the truth ; but it is important to examine which of them really hit the mark and by what guiding principle we can ourselves attain to certitude.

What, then, does Eternity really mean to those who (thus casually) describe it as something different from Time ? We begin with Eternity, since when the standing Exemplar is known, its representation in image — which Time is understood to be — will be clearly apprehended — though it is of course equally true, admitting this relationship of Time as image to Eternity the original, that if we chose to begin by identifying Time we could thence proceed upwards by Recognition (the 2ime is understood to be — will be clearly apprehended — though it is of course equally true, admitting this relationship of Time as image to Eternity the original, that if we chose to begin by identifying Time we could thence proceed upwards by Recognition (the Platonic Anamnesis) and become aware of the Kind which it images.

2.

What definition are we to give of Eternity ?

Can it be identified with the (divine or) Intellectual Substance itself ?

This would be like identifying Time with the Universe of Heavens and Earth — an opinion, it is true, which appears to have had its adherents. No doubt we conceive, we know. Eternity as something most august ; most august, too, is the Intellectual Kind ; and there is no possibility of saying that the one is more majestic than the other, since no such degrees can be asserted in the Above-World ; there is therefore a certain excuse for the identification — aU the more since the Intellectual Substance and Eternity have the one scope and content.

Still ; by the fact of representing the one as contained within the other, by making Eternity a predicate to the Intellectual Existents — “ the Nature of the Exemplar,” we read, “ is eternal ” — we cancel the identification ; Eternity becomes a separate thing, something surrounding

that Nature or lying within it or present to it. And the majestic quality of both does not prove them identical : it might be transmitted from the one to the other. So, too, Eternity and the Divine Nature envelop the same entities, yes ; but not in the same way : the Divine may be thought of as enveloping parts, Eternity as embracing its content in an unbroken whole, with no implication of part, but merely from the fact that all eternal things are so by conforming to it.

May we, perhaps, identify Eternity with Repose-There as Time has been identified with Movement-Here ?

This would bring on the counter-question whether Eternity is presented to us as Repose in the general sense or as the Repose that envelops the Intellectual Essence.

On the first supposition we can no more talk of Repose being eternal than of Eternity being eternal : to be eternal is to participate in an outside thing, Eternity.

Further, if Eternity is Repose, what becomes of Eternal Movement, which, by this identification, would become a thing of Repose ?

Again, the conception of Repose scarcely seems to include that of perpetuity— I am speaking of course not of perpetuity in the time-order (which might follow on absence of movement) but of that which we have in mind when we speak of Eternity.