The Enneads — trans. Stephen MacKenna

from passing outside itself ; as the plan holds, life is poured copiously throughout a Universe, engendering the universal things and weaving variety into their being, never at rest from producing an endless sequence of comeliness and shapeliness, a living pastime.

Men directing their weapons against each other — under doom of death yet neatly lined up to fight as in the pyrrhic sword-dances of their sport — this is enough to tell us that all human intentions are but play, that death is nothing terrible, that to die in a war or in a fight is but to taste a little beforehand what old age has in store, to go away earlier and come back the sooner. So for misfortunes that may accompany life, the loss of property, for instance ; the loser will see that there was a time when it was not his, that its possession is but a mock boon to the robbers, who will in their turn lose it to others, and even, that to retain property is a greater loss than to forfeit it.

Murders, death in all its guises, the reduction and sacking of cities, aU must be to us just such a spectacle as the changing scenes of a play ; aU is but the varied incident of a plot, costume on and off, acted grief and lament. For on earth, in all the succession of life, it is not the Soul within but the Shadow outside of the authentic man, that grieves and complains and acts out the plot on this world stage which men have dotted with stages of their own constructing. All this is the doing of

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PLOTINUS

man knowing no more than to live the lower and outer life, and never perceiving that, in his weeping and in his graver doings alike, he is but at play ; to handle austere matters austerely is reserved for the thoughtful ; the other kind of man is himself a futility. Those incapable of thinking gravely read gravity into frivolities which correspond to their own frivolous Nature. Anyone that joins in their trifling and so comes to look on life with their eyes must understand that by lending himself to such idleness he has laid aside his own character. If Socrates himself takes part in the trifling, he trifles in the outer Socrates.

We must remember, too, that we cannot take tears and laments as proof that anything is wrong ; children cry and whimper where there is nothing amiss.

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side his own character. If Socrates himself takes part in the trifling, he trifles in the outer Socrates.

We must remember, too, that we cannot take tears and laments as proof that anything is wrong ; children cry and whimper where there is nothing amiss.

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But if all this is true, what room is left for evil ? Where are we to place wrong-doing and sin ?

How explain that in a world organised in good, the efficient agents (human beings) behave unjustly, commit sin ? And how comes misery if neither sin nor injustice exists ?

Again, if all our action is determined by a natural process, how can the distinction be maintained between behaviour in accordance with nature and behaviour in conflict with it ?

And what becomes of blasphemy against the divine ? The blasphemer is made what he is : a dramatist has written a part insulting and maligning himself and given it to an actor to play.

These considerations oblige us to state the Logos (the Reason- Principle of the Universe) once again, and more clearly, and to justify its nature.

This Reason-Principle, then — let us dare the definition in the hope of convejdng the truth— this Logos is not the Intellectual Principle unmingled, not the Absolute Divine Intellect ; nor does it descend from the pure Soul alone ; it is a dependent of that Soul while, in a sense, it is a radiation from both those divine Hypostases : the Intellectual Principle and the Soul — the Soul as conditioned by the Intellectual

III. 2. l6]

PROVIDENCE

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Principle — engender this Logos which is a Life holding restfully a certain measure of Reason.

Now all life, even the least valuable, is an activity, and not a blind activity like that of flame ; even where there is not sensation the activity' of life is no mere haphazard play of Movement : any object in which life is present, any object which participates in Life, is at once enreasoned in the sense that the activity peculiar to life is formative, shaping as it moves.

Life, then, aims at pattern as does the pantomimic dancer with his set movements ; the mime, in himself, represents life, and, besides, his movements proceed in obedience to a pattern designed to symbolise life.

Thus far to give us some idea of the nature of Life in general.

But this Reason-Principle which emanates from the complete unity, divine Mind, and the complete unity Life (=Soul) — is neither a uniate complete Life nor a uniate complete divine Mind, nor does it give itself whole and all-including to its subj ect .

in general.

But this Reason-Principle which emanates from the complete unity, divine Mind, and the complete unity Life (=Soul) — is neither a uniate complete Life nor a uniate complete divine Mind, nor does it give itself whole and all-including to its subj ect . (By an imperfect communication) it sets up a conflict of part against part : it produces imperfect things and so engenders and maintains war and attack, and thus its unity can be that only of a sum-total not of a thing undivided. At war with itself in the parts which it now exhibits, it has the unity, or harmony, of a drama tom with struggle. The drama, of course, brings the conflicting elements to one final harmony, weaving the entire story of the clashing characters into one thing ; while in the Logos the conflict of the divergent elements rises within the one element, the Reason-Principle : the comparison therefore is rather with a harmony emerging directly from the conflicting elements themselves, and the question becomes what introduces clashing elements among these Reason-Principles.

Now in the case of music, tones high and low are the product of Reason-Principles which, by the fact that they are Principles of harmony, meet in the unit of Harmony, the absolute Harmony, a more comprehensive Principle, greater than they and including them as its parts. Similarly in the Universe at large we find contraries — white and black, hot and cold, winged and wingless, footed and footless, reasoning and unreasoning — but all these elements are members of one living body.

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their sum-total ; the Universe is a self-accordant entity, its members everywhere clashing but the total being the manifestation of a Reason- Principle. That one Reason-Principle, then, must be the unification of conflicting Reason-Principles whose very opposition is the support of its coherence and, almost, of its Being.

And indeed, if it were not multiple, it could not be a Universal Principle, it could not even be at all a Reason-Principle ; in the fact of its being a Reason-Principle is contained the fact of interior difference. Now the maximum of difference is contrariety ; admitting that this differentiation exists and creates, it will create difference in the greatest and not in the least degree ; in other words, the Reason-Principle, bringing about differentiation to the uttermost degree, will of necessity create contrarieties ; it will be complete only by producing itself not in merely diverse things but in contrary things.