The Enneads — trans. Stephen MacKenna

reasoning faculty in it which derives from the Intellectual Principle and communicates to the rest. And this following of reason is not the acceptance of an imposed shape ; it is like using the eyes ; the Soul sees by its act, that of looking towards reason. The faculty of sight in the performance of its act is essentially what it was when it lay latent ; its act is not a change in it, but simply its entering into the relation that belongs to its essential character ; it knows — that is, sees — without suffering any change : so, precisely, the reasoning phase of the Soul stands towards the Intellectual Principle ; this it sees by its very essence ; this vision is its knowing faculty ; it takes in no stamp, no impression ; all that enters it is the object of vision — possessed, once more, without possession ; it possesses by the fact of knowing but “ without possession ” in the sense that there is no incorporation of anything left behind by the object of vision, like the impression of the seal on sealing-wax.

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PLOTINUS

And note that we do not appeal to stored-up impressions to account for memory ; we think of the mind awakening its powers in such a way as to possess something not present to it.

Very good : but is it not different before and after acquiring the memory ?

Be it so ; but it has suffered no change — unless we are to think of the mere progress from latency to actuality as change — nothing has been introduced into the mind ; it has simply achieved the Act dictated by its nature.

It is universally true that the characteristic Act of immaterial entities is performed without any change in them — otherwise they would at last be worn away — theirs is the Act of the unmoving ; where act means suffering change, there is Matter : an immaterial Being would have no ground of permanence if its very Act changed it.

Thus in the case of Sight, the seeing faculty is in act but the material organ alone suffers change : judgements, (true or false, are not changes within the Soul ; they) are similar to visual experiences.

But how explain the alternation of timidity and daring in the initiative faculty ?

Timidity would come by the failure to look towards the Reason- Principle or by looking towards some inferior phase of it or by some defect in the organs of action— some lack or flaw in the bodily equipment — or by outside prevention of the natural act or by the mere absence of adequate stimulus : boldness would arise from the reverse conditions : neither implies any change, or even any experience, in the Soul.

of action— some lack or flaw in the bodily equipment — or by outside prevention of the natural act or by the mere absence of adequate stimulus : boldness would arise from the reverse conditions : neither implies any change, or even any experience, in the Soul.

So with the faculty of desire : what we call loose living is caused by its acting unaccompanied ; it has done all of itself ; the other faculties, whose business it is to make their presence felt in control and to point the right way, have lain in abeyance ; the Seer in the Soul was occupied elsewhere, for, though not always at least sometimes, it has leisure for a certain degree of contemplation of other concerns.

Often, moreover, the vice of the desiring faculty will be merely some ill condition of the body, and its virtue, bodily soundness ; thus there would again be no question of anything imported into the Soul.

111.6.3] THE IMPASSIVITY OF THE UNEMBODIED

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3.

But how do we explain likings and aversions ? Sorrow, too, and anger and pleasure, desire and fear — are these not changes, affectings, present and stirring within the Soul ?

This question cannot be ignored. To deny that changes take place and are intensely felt is in sharp contradiction to obvious facts. But, while we recognise this, we must make very sure what it is that changes. To represent the Soul or Mind as being the seat of these emotions is not far removed from making it blush or turn pale ; it is to forget that while the Soul or Mind is the means, the effect takes place in the distinct organism, the animated body.

At the idea of disgrace, the shame is in the Soul ; but the body is occupied by the Soul — not to trouble about words — is, at any rate, close to it and very different from soulless matter ; and so, is affected in the blood, mobile in its nature. Fear begins in the mind ; the pallor is simply the withdrawal of the blood inwards. So in pleasure, the elation is mental, but makes itself felt in the body ; the purely mental phase has not reached the point of sensation : the same is true of pain. So desire is ignored in the Soul where the impulse takes its rise ; what comes outward thence, the Sensibility knows.

When we speak of the Soul or Mind being moved — as in desire, reasoning, judging — ^we do not mean that it is driven into its act ; these movements are its own acts.

In the same way when we call Life a movement we have no idea of a changing substance ; the naturally appropriate act of each member of the living thing makes up the Life, which is, therefore, not a shifting thing.

o its act ; these movements are its own acts.

In the same way when we call Life a movement we have no idea of a changing substance ; the naturally appropriate act of each member of the living thing makes up the Life, which is, therefore, not a shifting thing.

To bring the matter to the point : put it that life, tendency, are no changements ; that memories are not forms stamped upon the mind, that notions are not of the nature of impressions on sealing-wax ; we thence draw the general conclusion that in all such states and movements the Soul, or Mind, is unchanged in substance and in essence, that virtue and vice are not something imported into the Soul— as heat and cold, blackness or whiteness are importations into body — but that, in all this relation, matter and spirit are exactly and comprehensively contraries.

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PLOTINUS

4’

We have, however, still to examine what is called the affective phase of the Soul. This has, no doubt, been touched upon above where we dealt with the passions in general as grouped about the initiative phase of the Soul and the desiring faculty in its effort to shape things to its choice : but more is required ; we must begin by forming a clear idea of what is meant by this affective faculty of the Soul.

In general terms it means the centre about which we recognise the affections to be grouped ; and by affections we mean those states upon which follow pleasure and pain.

Now among these affections we must distinguish. Some are pivoted upon judgements ; thus, a Man judging his death to be at hand may feel fear ; foreseeing some fortunate turn of events, he is happy : the opinion lies in one sphere ; the affection is stirred in another. Sometimes the affections take the lead and automatically bring in the notion which thus becomes present to the appropriate faculty ; but as we have explained, an act of opinion does not introduce any change into the Soul or Mind : what happens is that from the notion of some impending evil is produced the quite separate thing, fear, and this fear, in turn, becomes known in that part of the Mind which is said under such circumstances to harbour fear.

But what is the action of this fear upon the Mind ?

The general answer is that it sets up trouble and confusion before an evil anticipated.