116 separated.
2But one must take care to note that this separation is never absolutely real; it is real only in the measure in which we realise it, because that Lower World is contained in a potential state in the principial Universe, and it is evident that no part can really leave the whole.
3This, moreover, prevents the fall from continuing indefinitely; but this is only a wholly symbolic expression, and the depth of the fall simply measures the degree to which the separation has been realised.
4With this restriction, the Demiurge opposes himself to Adam Kadmon or to the principial Humanity, manifestation of the Word, but only as a reflection, because he is not an emanation and does not exist by himself; which is represented by the figure of the two old men of the Zohar and also by the two opposed triangles of the Seal of Solomon.
5We are thus led to consider the Demiurge as a tenebrous and inverted reflection of Being, for he can be nothing else, in reality.
6He is not, then, a Being; but, according to what we have said before, he can be considered as the collectivity of beings in the measure in which they are distinct or, if one prefers, while they have an individual existence.
7We are distinct beings while we create the distinction, which does not exist except so far as we create it; while we create this distinction we are elements of the Demiurge, and while we are distinct beings we belong to the domain of that same Demiurge, which we call Creation.
8All the elements of Creation, that is, the creatures, are, then, contained in the Demiurge himself and, in effect, he can draw them only from himself, since creation ex nihilo is impossible.
9Considered as Creator, the Demiurge produces, first, division, and is not at all really distinct from it, because he exists only on condition that division itself exist; then, as division is the origin of individual existence and as this is defined by form, the Demiurge must be considered as a former and, then, he is identical with the Adam Protoplast, as we saw.
10One can say further that the Demiurge creates Matter, understanding by this word the primordial chaos which is the common reservoir of all forms; then he organises that chaotic and tenebrous Matter in which confusion reigns, bringing forth from it the multiple forms whose assemblage constitutes Creation.
11Must we now say that this Operation is imperfect?
12It cannot, certainly, be considered perfect; but if we consider it from the universal point of view, it is only one of the constitutive elements of total Perfection.
13It is imperfect while we consider it analytically as separated from the Principle, that is, in the very measure in which it belongs to the domain of the Demiurge; but if the imperfect is only an element of the Perfect, it is not truly imperfect.
14From this it results that, in reality, the Demiurge and his domain do not exist from the universal point of view, just as the distinction between Good and Evil does not exist.
15From this it also results that, from the same point of view, Matter does not exist; the material appearance is only illusion — from which one must not conclude, on the other hand, that the beings which have that appearance do not exist, because, in that case, one would fall into another illusion, which is that of an exaggerated and ill-understood Idealism.
16If Matter does not exist, then the distinction between Spirit and Matter disappears.
17In reality, all must be Spirit, but understanding this word in a sense wholly different from that which the greater part of modern philosophers have attributed to it.
18These, in effect, although they oppose Spirit to Matter, do not consider it as independent of all form, and we may then ask ourselves in what it differs from Matter.
19If it is said that it has no extension while Matter has it, how can that which has no extension be clothed in a form?
20Moreover, why wish to define Spirit?
Our translation, period-faithful. Citable as our translation, never as the source.