The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

Those who boast with a view to reputation pre- 13 tend to those things for which a man, is commended or is thought happy ; those whose motive is gain pretend to those things which are of advantage to others, and whose absence may escape detection, e.g. to skill in magic or in medicine. And so it is usually something of this sort that men pretend to and boast of; for the conditions specified are realized in them.

Ironical people, on the other hand, with their 14 depreciatory way of speaking of themselves, seem to be of a more refined character ; for their motive in speaking thus seems to be not love of gain, but desire to avoid parade : and what they disclaim seems also * to be especially that which men esteem — of which Socrates was an instance.

(Thosewho[donot disclaim creditable things which 15 they have, but] pretend to contemptible things which they plainly have not, are called sham scoundrels (/3awK07ravou|07ot), and may well be held in contempt.)

And sometimes this self-depreciation is scarcely distinguishable from boasting, as for instance dressing like a Spartan ; for there is something boastful in extreme depreciation as well as in exaggeration.

But those who employ irony in moderation, and 16 speak ironically in matters that are not too obvious and palpable, appear to be men of refinement.

* The things that the boaster pretends to are also the things that the ironical man disclaims.

p. 131

Finally, the boaster seems to be especially the opposite of the truthful man; for he is worse than the ironical man.

8. Again, since relaxation is an element in our Qf»itti*et*. life, and one mode of relaxation is amusing conversation, it seems that in this respect also there is a proper way of mixing with others ; i.e. that there are things that it is right to say, and a right way of saying them : and the same with hearing ; though here also it will make a difference what kind of people they are in whose presence you are speaking, or to whom you are listening.

And it Ls plain that it is possible in these matters also to go beyond, or to fall short of, the mean.

Now, those who go to excess in ridicule seem to be buffoons and vulgar fellows, striving at all costs for ridiculous effect, and bent rather on raising a laugrh than on making their witticisms elegant and inoffensive to the subject of them. While those who will never say anything laughable themselves, and frown on those who do, are considered boorish and morose. But those who jest gracefully are called " witty," or " men of ready wit " (tvTpaireXoi), as it were " ready " or " versatile men."

For* a man's character seems to reveal itself in these sallies or playful movements, and so we judge of his moral constitution by them, as we judge of his body by its movements.

But through the prominence given to ridiculous things, and the excessive delight which most people

* What follows explains why all these terms have a specific moral meaning.

p. 132

take in amusement and jesting, the buffoon is often called witty because he gives delight. But that there is a difference, and a considerable difference, between the two is plain from what we have said.

An element in the character that observes the 5 mean in these matters is tact. A man of tact will only say and listen to such things as it befits an honest man and a gentleman to say and listen to; for there are things that it is quite becoming for such a man to say and to listen to in the way of jest, and the jesting of a gentleman differs from that of a man of slavish nature, and the jesting of an educated from that of an uneducated man.

This one may see by the difference between the old 6 comedy and the new : the fun of the earlier writers is obscenity, of the later innuendo ; and there is no slight difference between the two as regards decency.

Can good jesting, then, be defined as "making 7 jests that befit a gentleman," or " that do not pain the hearer," or even " that give him pleasure " ? Nay, I think this also is a thing that cannot be defined : different things are hateful and pleasant to different people.

But the things that he will listen to will be of the 8 same sort [as those that he will say, whatever that be] : jests that a man can listen to he can, we think, make himself