The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

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page 52

The translator’s English as printed (F. H. Peters). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.

He who errs slightly from the right course is not blamed, whether it be on the side of excess or of deficiency ; for sometimes we praise those who fall short and call them gentle, and sometimes those who behave hardly are called manly, as being able to rule. But what amount and kind of error makes a man blamable can scarcely be defined ; for it depends upon the particular circumstances of each case, and can only be decided by immediate perception. 14 But so much at least is manifest, that on the one hand the habit which observes the mean is to be praised, i.e. the habit which causes us to be angry with the right persons, at the right things, in the right manner, etc. ; and that, on the other hand, all habits of excess or deficiency deserve censure — slight censure if the error be trifling, graver censure if it be considerable, and severe censure if it be great.

1 6. It is evident, therefore, that we must strive for the habit which observes the mean.

This then may be taken as our account of the habits which have to do with anger.

In the matter of social intercourse, i.e. the living o/ agree. with others and joining with them in conversation and in common occupations, some men show themselves what is called obsequious — those who to please you praise everything, and never object to an>i;hing, but think they ought always to avoid

2 giving pain to those whom they meet. Those who take the opposite line, and object to everything and never think for a moment what pain they may give, are called cross and contentious.

3 It is sufficiently plain that both these habits

126 NICOMAOHEAN ETHICS OF AEISTOTLE. [Bk. IV.

merit censure, and that the habit which takcvS the middle course between them is to be commended— the habit which makes a man acquiesce in what he ought and in the right manner, and likewise refuse to acquiesce. This habit or type of character has no 4 recognized name, but seems most nearly to resemble " friendliness " ((piXia) ; for the man who exhibits this moderation is the same sort of man that we mean to denote by the term "an upright friend," only that this term implies affection also. But it differs from 5 friendliness in that it does not imply emotion and affection for those with whom we associate ; for he who has this quality acquiesces when he ought, not because he loves or hates, but because that is his character. He will behave thus alike to those whom he knows and to those whom he does not know, to strangers and to acquaintances, to those with whom he is intimate and to those with whom he is not, only that in each case he wiU behave as is fitting; for we are not bound to show the same consideration to strangers as to intimates, nor to take the same care not to pain them.

We have already said in general terms that such 6 a man will behave as he ought in his intercourse with others, but we must add that, while he tries to contribute to the pleasure of others and to avoid giving them pain, he will always be guided by reference to that which is noble and fitting. It seems to 7 be with the pleasures and pains of social intercourse that he is concerned. Now, whenever he finds that it is not noble, or is positively hurtful to himself, to contribute to any of these pleasures, he will refuse top. 127 acquiesce and -vrill prefer to give pain. And if the pleasure is such as to involve discredit, and no slight discredit, or some injury to him who is the source of it, while his opposition will give a little pain, he will not acquiesce, but will set his face against

8 it. But he will behave differently according as he is in the company of great people or ordinary people, of intimate friends or mere acquaintances, and so on, rendering to each his due ; preferring, apart from other considerations, to promote pleasure, and loth to give pain, but regulating his conduct by consideration of the consequences, if they be considerable — by con-

9 sideration, I mean, of what is noble and fitting. And thus for the sake of great pleasure in the future he will inflict a slight pain now.

The man who observes the mean, then, is something of this sort, but has no recognized name.

Commentary
page 52 ·

No commentary for this page.

There is commentary on pages 7, 20, 30, 140.