The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

So then there are jests that he will not make 9 [though we cannot exactly define them] ; for to make a jest of a man is to vilify him in a way, and the law forbids certain kinds of vilification, and ought perhaps also to forbid certain kinds of jesting.

The refined and gentlemanly man, therefore, will thus regulate his vdt, being as it were a law to himself.

10 This then is the character of him who observes the mean, whether we call him a man of tact or a man of ready wit.

The buffoon, on the other hand, cannot resist an opportunity for a joke, and, if he can but raise a laugh, will spare neither himself nor others, and will say things which no man of refinement would say, and some of which he would not even listen to.

The boor, lastly, is wholly useless for this kind of intercourse ; he contributes nothing, and takes every-

11 thing in ill part. And yet recreation and amusement seem to be necessary ingredients in our life.

In conclusion, then, the modes just described of observing the mean in social life are three in number,* and all have to do with conversation or joint action of some kind : but they differ in that one has to do with truth, while the other two are concerned with what is pleasant ; and of the two that are concerned with pleasure, one finds its field in our amusements, the other in all other kinds of social intercourse.

1 9. Shame (atSwc) cannot properly be spoken oi ^^ as a \drtue ; for it is more like a feeling or emotion **<'"<• than a habit or trained faculty. At least, it is

2 defined as a kind of fear of disgrace, and its effects are analogous to those of the fear that is excited by danger ; for men blush when they are ashamed, while the fear of death makes them pale. Both then seem to be in a way physical, which is held to be a mark

* Friendliness, trathfulness, wit.

134 NICOMAOHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. [Bk. IV.

of a feeling or emotion, rather than of a habit or trained faculty.

Again, it is a feeling which is not becoming at all 3 times of life, but only in youth ; it is thought proper for young people to be ready to feel shame, because, as their conduct is guided by their emotions, they often are misled, but are restrained from wrong actions by shame.

And so we praise young men when they are ready to feel shame, but no one would praise a man of more advanced years for being apt to be ashamed ; for we consider that he ought not to do anything which could make him ashamed of himself

And so a good man has no business with shame, 4 seeing that it is occasioned by base acts ; for such acts should not be done at all.

It may be said that some acts are really disgrace- 5 ful, others disgraceful only in public estimation ; but that makes no difference : neither ought to be done, and so a man ought to have no occasion to be ashamed.

And to be the sort of a man that would do a dis- 6 graceful deed is to be other than a good man.

But supposing a man's character to be such that, if he were to do one of these disgraceful acts, he would be ashamed, it is absurd to fancy that he is a good man on that account ; for shame is only felt at voluntary acts, and a good man will never voluntarily do vile acts.

At the utmost, shame would be hypothetically 7 good ; that is to say, supposing he was to do the act, a good man would be ashamed : but there is nothing hypothetical about the virtues.

p. 135

Again, granting that it is bad to be shameless, or not to be ashamed to do disgraceful things, it does not therefore follow that it is good to do them and be ashamed of it

Continence,* in the same way, is not a virtue, but something between virtue and vice.

But we will explain this point about continence later; t let us now treat of justice.

* The continent man desires the evil, which he onght not to desire, and so is not good ; bat he does not do it, and so is not bad : his conduct also might be called " hypothetically gowl." Granting the evil desire (which excludes goodness proper), the best thing is to master it.

t Book YU.

BOOK V.

THE SAME — concluded. JUSTICE.

prehwi- 1. We now have to inquire about justice and in- l