The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)
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t Which shows that the acta are regarded as roluntary.
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blamed ; for no worthy person would endure the extremity of disgrace when there was no noble result in A^ew, or but a trifling one.
But in some cases we do not praise, but pardon, i.e. when a man is induced to do a wrong act by pressure which is too strong for human nature and which no one could bear. Though there are some cases 8 of this kind, I think, where the plea of compulsion is inadmissible,* and where, rather than do the act, a man ought to suffer death in its most painful form ; for instance, the circumstances which " compelled " Alcmseon in Euripides f to kill his mother seem absurd.
It is sometimes hard to decide whether we ought 9 to do this deed to avoid this evil, or whether we ought to endure this evil rather than do this deed ; but it is still harder to abide by our decisions : for generally the evil which we wish to avoid is something painful, the deed we are pressed to do is something disgraceful ; and hence we are blamed or praised according as we do or do not suffer ourselves to be compelled.
What kinds of acts, then, are to be called com- K pulsory ?
I think our answer must be that, in the first place, t The play alluded to seems to be entirely lost.
* ovK %(TTiv ayayKacrOTJuai, " compulsion is impossible." If the act was compulsory it was not my act, I cannot be blamed : there are some acts, says Aristotle, for which we could not forgive a man, for which, whatever the circumstances, we must blame him ; therefore no circumstances can compel him, or compulsion is impossible. The argument is, in fact, " I ought not, therefore I can not (am able not to do it)," — like Kant's, " I ought, therefore I can." But, if valid at all, it is valid universally, and the conclusion should be that the body only can be compelled, and not the will — that a compulsory act is impossible.
1, 8-11.] THE WILL. 61
when the cause lies outside and the agent has no part in it, the act is called, without qualification, "compulsory " [and therefore involuntary]; but that, in the second place, when an act that would not be voluntarily done for its own sake is chosen now in preference to this given alternative, the cause lying in the agent, such an act must be called "involuntary in itself," or " in the abstract," but " now, and in preference to this alternative, voluntary." But an act of the latter kind is rather of the nature of a voluntary act : for acts fall within the sphere of particulars ; and here the particular thing that is done is voluntary.
It is scarcely possible, however, to lay down rules for determining which of two alternatives is to be preferred ; for there are many differences in the particular cases.
It might, perhaps, be urged that acts whose motive is something pleasant or something noble are compulsory, for here we are constrained by something outside us.
But if this were so, aU our acts would be compulsory; for these are the motives of every act of every man.*
Again, acting under compulsion and against one's will is painful, but action whose motive is something pleasant or noble involves pleasure, f
• Therefore, strictly speaking, a " compulsory act " is a contradiction in terms ; the real question is, " What is an act ? "
t Therefore, since these are the motives of every act, all voluntary action involves pleasure. If we add " when successful," this quite agrees with Aristotle's theory of pleasure in Books VII. and X.
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It is absurd, then, to blame things outside us instead of our own readiness to yield to their allurements, and, while we claim our noble acts as our own, to set down our disgraceful actions to "pleasant things outside us."
Compulsory, then, it appears, is that of which the 12 cause is external, the person compelled contributing nothing thereto.