The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

Sometimes, again, an extreme, when compared with the mean, has a sort of resemblance to it, as foolp. 54hardiness to courage, or prodigality to liberality ; but there is the greatest possible dissimilarity between the extremes.

Again, " things that are as far as possible removed from each other " is the accepted definition of contraries, so that the further things are removed from each other the more contrary they are.

In comparison with the mean, however, it is some- 6 times the deficiency that is the more opposed, and sometimes the excess; e.g. foolhardiness, which is excess, is not so much opposed to courage as cowardice, which is deficiency ; but insensibility, which is lack of feeling, is not so much opposed to temperance as profligacy, which is excess.

The reasons for this are two. One is the reason 7 derived from the nature of the matter itself: since one extreme is, in fact, nearer and more similar to the mean, we naturally do not oppose it to the mean so strongly as the other ; e.g. as foolhardiness seems more similar to courage and nearer to it, and cowardice more dissimilar, we speak of cowardice as the opposite rather than the other : for that which is further removed from the mean seems to be more opposed to it.

This, then, is one reason, derived from the nature 8 of the thing itself Another reason lies in ourselves : and it is this — those things to which we happen to be more prone by nature appear to be more opposed to the mean : e.g. our natural inclination is rather towards indulgence in pleasure, and so we more easily fall into profligate than into regular habits : those courses, then, in which we are more apt to run to great lengths are spoken of as more opposed to the

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mean ; and thus profligacy, -which is an excess, is more opposed to temperance than the deficiency is.

1 9. We have sufficienth* explained, then, that moral i*« i hard to kit, virtue is moderation or observance of the mean, anda"<iw«,

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in what sense, viz. (1) as holding a middle position p«'tt!p*»<>". between two vices, one on the side of excess, and the rtatonimg. other on the side of deficiency, and (2) as aiming at the mean or moderate amoimt both in feeling and in action.

2 And on this account it is a hard thing to be good ; for finding the middle or the mean in each case is a hard thing, just as finding the middle or centre of a circle is a thing that is not within the power of everybody, but only of him who has the requisite knowledge.

Thus any one can be angry — that is quite easy ; any one can give money away or spend it : but to do these things to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right object, and in the right manner, is not what everybody can do, and Ls by no means easy ; and that is the reason why right doing is rare and praiseworthy and noble.

3 He that aims at the mean, then, should first of all strive to avoid that extreme which is more opposed to it, as Calypso * bids Ulysses —

" Clear of these smoking breakers keep thy ship."

4 For of the extremes one is more dangerous, the other less. Since then it is hard to hit the mean precisely, we must " tack as we cannot run," to use the sailor's phrase, and choose the least of two evils ;

• Horn., Od., lii. 101-110, and 219-220 : Calypso should be Circe.

56 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. [Bk. IT.]

and that will be best effected in the way we have described.

And secondly we must consider, each for himself, what we are most prone to — for different natures are inclined to different things — which we may learn by the pleasure or pain we feel. And then we must bend 5 ourselves in the opposite direction; for by keeping well away from error we shall fall into the middle " course, as we straighten a bent stick by bending it in the contrary direction.