The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

Besides this, however, the agent must be grieved li and sorry for what he has done, if the act thus ignorantly committed is to be called involuntary [not merely not-voluntary].

* Nothing seems to be known of the case alluded to.

t T^ ov 'iv€Ka usually is the intended result (and so eVe/co rivoi in § 16), but of course it is only the actual result that the agent can be ignorant of.

1, 18-27.] THE WILL. 65

But now, having found that an act is involuntary when done under compulsion or through ignorance, we may conclude that a voluntary act is one which is originated by the doer with knowledge of the particular circumstances of the act.

21 For I venture to think that it is incorrect to say that acts done through anger or desire are involuntary.

22 In the first place, if this be so we can no longer allow that any of the other animals act voluntarily, nor even children.

23 Again, does the saying mean that none of the acts which we do through desire or anger are voluntary, or that the noble ones are voluntary and the disgraceful lies involuntary ? Interpreted in the latter sense, it is surely ridiculous, as one man is the author of both.

24 If we take the fonner interpretation, it is absurd, I think, to say that things which we ought to desire are involuntary, or against our wills ; but, in fact, there are things at which we ought to be angry, and things which we ought to desire, e.g. health and learning.

Again, it seems that what is done unwillingly is painful, while what is done through desire is pleasant. 26 Again, what difiference is there, in respect of inoluntariness, between wrong deeds done upon calculation and wrong deeds done in anger ? Both alike are to be avoided, and our unreasoning passions or feelings seem to be just as much our own [as our reasonings or calculations].

But the fact is that all human actions proceed either from anger or from desire : * to make all such actions involuntaiy, therefore, would be too absurd.

* Not that reason or calculation cannot modify action, but it

F

p. 66Purpose, a 2. Now that we have distinguished voluntary from l mode of will, .,, , iii*i_T ^ • means choice mvoluntarv acts, our next task is to discuss cnoice after ^ '

deliberation, or purpose. For it seeuis to be most intimately connected with virtue, and to be a surer test of character than action itself.

It seems that choosing is willing, but that the two 2 terms are not identical, willing being the wider. For children and other animals have will, but not choice or purpose ; and acts done upon the spur of the moment are said to be voluntary, but not to be done with deliberate purpose.

Those who say that choice is desire, or anger, or 3 wish, or an opinion of some sort, do not seem to give a correct account of it.

In the first place, choice is not shared by irrational creatures, but appetite and anger are.

Again, the incontinent man desires what he does, 4 but does not purpose or deliberately choose it. The continent man, on the other hand, deliberately chooses what he does, but does not desire it.

Again, there is often a conflict between desire and 5 purpose ; but there cannot be a conflict between desire and desire.*

Again, the object of appetite, or desire, is the pleasant or the painful,! but the object of purpose [as such] is neither painful nor pleasant.

can only do so by modifying passion or feeling. Every action (irpa^is;} issues from a feeling or passion (irdOos), which feeling (and therefore the resultant action) is mine (the outcome of my character, and therefore imputable to me), whether it be modified by reason (deliberation, calculation) or no.

* Purpose must be different from desire, since there is often a conflict between them : cf. Plato, Eep., 439, 440.

f Less painful = pleasanter.

2, 1-11.] THE WILL. 67

Still less can purpose be anger (Bvfxog); for acts done in anger seem to be least of all done of purpose or deliberate choice.

Nor yet is it wish, though it seem very like ; for we cannot purpose or deliberately choose the impossible, and a man who should say that he did would be thought a fool ; but we may wish for the impossible, e.g. to escape death.

Again, while we may wish what never could be effected by our own agency (e.g. the success of a particular actor or athlete), we never purpose or deliberately choose such things, but only those that we think may be effected by our own agency.