The Republic — Plato

him by Plato were really held either by him or by any other Sophist is uncertain; in the infancy of philosophy serious errors about morality might easily grow up — they are certainly put into the mouths of speakers in Thucydides; but we are concerned at present with Plato's description of him, and not with the historical reality. The inequality of the contest adds greatly to the humor of the scene.

The pompous and empty Sophist is utterly helpless in the hands of the great master of dialectic, who knows how to touch all the springs of vanity and weakness in him. He is greatly irritated by the irony of Socrates, but his noisy and imbecile rage only lays him more and more open to the thrusts of his assailant. His determination to cram down their throats, or put " bodily into their souls " his own words, elicits a cry of horror from Socrates.

The state of his temper is quite as worthy of remark as the process of the argument. Nothing is more amusing than his complete submission when he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first he seems to continue the discussion with reluctance, but soon with apparent good-will, and he even testifies his interest at a later stage by one or two occasional remarks (v. 450 A, B). When attacked by Glaucon (vi.

498 C, D) he is humorously protected by Socrates " as one who has never been his enemy and is now his friend. From Cicero and Quintilian and from Aristotle's "Rhetoric" (iii. i. 7; ii. 23. 29) we learn that the Sophist whom Plato has made so ridiculous was a man of note whose writings were preserved in later ages. The play on his name which was made by his contemporary Herodicus (Aris. " Rhet." ii.

23, 29), "thou wast ever bold in battle," seems to show that the description of him is not devoid of verisimilitude. When Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents, Glaucon and Adeimantus, appear on the scene; here, as in Greek tragedy (cp. Introd. to "Phjedo"), three actors are introduced. At first sight the two sons of Ariston may seem to wear a family likeness, like the two friends Simmias and Cebes in the " Phasdo.

But on a nearer examination of them the similarity vanishes, and they are seen to be distinct characters. Glaucon is the impetuous youth who can "just never have enough of fechting " (cp. the character of him in Xen. " Mem." iii. 6) ; the man of pleasure who is 2acquainted with the mysteries of love (v. 474 D) ; the " juvcnis qui gaudct canibus," and who improves the breed of animals (v. 459 A) ; the lover of art and music (iii. 398 D, E) who has all the experiences of youthful life.

He is full of quickness and penetration, piercing easily below the clumsy platitudes of Thrasymachus to the real difficulty ; he turns out to the light the seamy side of human life, and yet docs not lose faith in the just and true. It is Glaucon who seizes what may be termed the ludicrous relation of the philosopher to the world, to whom a state of simplicity is " a city of pigs," who is always prepared with a jest (iii. 398 C, 407 A; v.

450, 451, 468 C; vi. 509 C; ix. 586) when the argument offers him an opportunity, and who is ever ready to second the humor of Socrates and to apprecate the ridiculous, whether in the connoisseurs of music (vii. 531 A) or in the lovers of theatricals (v. 475 D) or in the fantastic behavior of the citizens of democracy (viii. 557 foil.). His weaknesses are several times alluded to by Socrates (iii. 402 E; v.

474 D, 475 E), who, however, will not allow him to be attacked by his brother Adeimantus (viii. 548 D, E). He is a soldier, and, like Adeimantus, has been distinguished at the battle of Megara (368 A, anno 456?). , . . The character of Adeimantus is deeper and graver, and the profounder objections are commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more demonstrative, and generally opens the game; Adeimantus pursues the argument further.

Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of youth ; Adeimantus has the maturer judgment of a grown-up man of the world.

In the second book, when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall be considered without regard to their consequences, Adeimantus remarks that they are regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their consequences ; and in a similar vein of reflection he urges at the beginning of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making his citizens happy, and is answered that happiness is not the first, but the second thing, not the direct aim, but the indirect consequence of the good government of a State.

In the discussion about religion and mythology, Adeimantus is the respondent (iii. 376-398) ; but at p. 398 C, Glaucon breaks in with a slight jest, and carries on the conversation in a lighter tone about music and gymnastics to the end of the book. It 3is Acleimantus again who volunteers the criticism of commonsense on the Socratic method of argument (vi. 487 B), and who refuses to let Socrates pass lightly over the question of women and children (v. 449). It is Adeimantus who is the respondent in the more argumentative, as Glaucon in the lighter and more imaginative, portions of the dialogue.

For example, throughout the greater part of the sixth book, the causes of the corruption of philosophy and the conception of the idea of good are discussed with Adeimantus. At p. 506 C, Glaucon resumes his place of principal respondent ; but he has a difficulty in apprehending the higher education of Socrates, and makes some false hits in the course of the discussion (526 D, 527 D). Once more Adeimantus returns (viii.

548) with the allusion to his brother Glaucon whom he compares to the contentious State; in the next book (ix. 576) he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues to the end (x. 621 B).

Thus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive stages of morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time, who is followed by the practical man of that day regulating his life by proverbs and saws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of the Sophists, and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher, who know the sophistical arguments but will not be convinced by them, and desire to go deeper into the nature of things.

These, too, like Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one another. Neither in the " Republic," nor in any other dialogue of Plato, is a single character repeated. The delineation of Socrates in the " Republic " is not wholly consistent. In the first book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted in the " Memorabilia " of Xenophon, in the earliest dialogues of Plato, and in the " Apology.

He is ironical, provoking, questioning, the old enemy of the Sophists, ready to put on the mask of Silenus as well as to argue seriously. But in the sixth book his enmity toward the Sophists abates ; he acknowledges that they are the representatives rather than the corrupters of the world (vi. 492 A). He also becomes more dogmatic and constructive, passing beyond the range either of the political or the speculative ideas, of the real Socrates. In one passage (vi. 506 C) Plato himself seems to intimate that the time had now come for Socrates,