The Republic — Plato

really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion. Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with us and our argument? A great deal ; for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition. In what way?

Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures. Why, no, he said, that was never considered by us.

I said : Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men ; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely? That would be a jest, he said.

Yes, I said, a jest ; and why? because we never meant when we constructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged ; we should have argued, for example, that a physician and one who is in mind a physician ^ may be said to have the same nature. True. Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures ?

Certainly.

And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them ; but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive; and we shall therefore continue to main- • Reading lorpbi' iiev Koi iarpiKov rriv xj/vxh" ovra.

tain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits. Very true, he said. Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man? That will be quite fair. And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy ; but after a little reflection there is no difficulty. Yes, perhaps.

Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would afifect them in the administration of the State. By all means.

Let us say to him : Come now, and we will ask you a question : When you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty ; a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal, whereas the other, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets ; or again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while the body of the other is a hinderance to him ? — would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?

No one will deny that. And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd ?

You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to many men, yet on the whole what you say is true. And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration in a State which a woman has because she is a

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woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are ahke diffused in both ; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man. Very true. Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women? That will never do. One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another has no music in her nature? Very true. And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics? Certainly. And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit? That is also true. Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort? Yes. Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness. Obviously. And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character? Very true. And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits ? They ought. Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastics to the wives of the guardians— to that point we come round again. Certainly not. The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration ; and the contrary practice, which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature. That appears to be true. 10

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PLATO