The Republic — Plato
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about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject — the quality, I mean, of everyone doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm — the question is not so easily answered. Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.
Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage. Yes, he said. And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice? Exactly. Let us look at the question from another point of view : Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would intrust the office of determining suits-at-law ? Certainly.
And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own? Yes; that is their principle. Which is a just principle? Yes. Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him? Very true. Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not.
Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter ; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change ; do you think that any great harm would result to the State? Not much.
But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and cither to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State. Most true. Seeing, then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing? Precisely.
And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice? Certainly. This, then, is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just. I agree with you.
We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet ; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt ; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh inquiry.
First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found.
Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual — if they agree, we shall be satisfied ; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls. That will be in regular course ; let us do as you say.
I proceeded to ask : When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same? Like, he replied. The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?
He will. And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business ; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes? True, he said.
And so of the individual ; we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is afifected in the same manner? Certainly, he said. Once more, then, O my friend, we have alighted vipon an easy question — whether the soul has these three principles or not? An easy question ! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good.
Very true, I said ; and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question ; the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous inquiry. May we not be satisfied with that ? he said ; under the circumstances, I am quite content. I, too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.
Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said. Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State ; and that from the individual they pass into the State? — how else can they come there?
Take the quality of passion or spirit ; it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g., the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the Northern nations ; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.
Exactly so, he said. There is no difficulty in understanding this. None whatever. But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to
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