Timaeus — Plato
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
and must therefore be paid. 25 and not the stronger — to their good they attend and not to Republic i. the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Sockates, Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is ^^^^^^o^- willing: to govern ; because no one likes to take in hand the perfecuon of o o ' his art ; and reformation of evils which are not his concern without re- therefore he 347 muneration.
For, in the execution of his work, and in must be paid, giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects ; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honour, or a penalty for refusing. What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon.
The first two Three modes modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty °uiers 'mone is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment. honour, and a You mean that you do not understand the nature of this ^J^"^ ^^toTuie payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace? Very true.
And for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for them ; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirehngs, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment.
And this, as I imagine, The penalty is the reason why the forv\^ardness to take office, instead of '^f^^^^'^o^ ■' ' being ruled waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonourable, by an inferior. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself.
And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help — not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one in a city comwho is better than themselves, or indeed as good.
For there p°^^^ wholly "of good men is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of there would good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object ^^».sy<=^* •' unwillmgness of contention as to obtain office is at present ; then we should to rule.
p. 26
Thrasymachus is put to the question.
Rep7iblic I. Socrates, Glaucon, Thrasymachus.
Thrasymachus maintains that the life of the unjust is better than the life of the just.
A paradox still more extreme, have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects ; and every one who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger.
This latter question need not be further discussed at present ; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer? I for my part deem the Hfe of the just to be the more advantageous, he answered.
Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which 34^ Thrasymachus w^as rehearsing? Yes, I heard him, he rephed, but he has not convinced me. Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true? Most certainly, he replied.
If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide ; but if we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons. Very good, he said.
And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said. That which you propose. Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice? Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons. And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice? Certainly.
I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice? What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.
No commentary for this page under the selected tracks.
There is commentary on page 1.