Timaeus — Plato

The qualities of the philosophic nature. t8i already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of Republic vi. them — are not such persons, I ask, simply blind ? Sockates. Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition. Glaucon. And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?

There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who 4<S5; have this greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect. Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences. By all means. In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of Thephiiosothe philosopher has to be ascertained.

We must come to an ^J"" ^^^ '''y" iT r Qf truth and of understanding about him, and, when we have done so, then, all true being. if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State. What do you mean?

Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption. Agreed. And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being ; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable, which they are willing to renounce ; as we .said before of the lover and the man of ambition. True.

And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess? What quality? Truthfulness : they will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth. Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.

' May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word ; say rather, 'must be affirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.

l82

The spectator of all tune and all existence.

Republic VI. Socrates, Glaijcon.

He will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and therefore temperate and the reverse of covetous or mean.

^A,

In the magnificenceof his contemplations he will not think much of human life.

Right, he said. And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth? How can there be? Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood? Never. The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth? Assuredly. But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others ; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel. True. He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure — I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one. That is most certain. Such an one is sure to be of covetous ; for the motives temperate and the reverse which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character. Very true. Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be 486 considered. What is that? There should be no secret corner of illiberality ; nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human. Most true, he replied. Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life? He cannot. Or can such an one account death fearful? No indeed. Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?

In idea the philosopJier is perfect. 183 Certainly not. Republic vi. Or again : can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is Socrates, not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a coward — can he, ^'-'^^'^o'^- I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings? Impossible. Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and He win be erentle, or rude and unsociable; these are the signs which °f^e^"''^' o ' ' ° sociable, distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from harmonious the unphilosophical. "''^'"'"^f ^ ^ lover of learn- True, ing, having a There is another point which should be remarked. ^°^ memory '^ and moving What point? spontaneously Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for o"bJng°'^ no one will love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress. Certainly not. And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel? That is certain. Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation? Yes. Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures ; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory? Certainly. And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion? Undoubtedly. And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion? To proportion. Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything. Certainly. Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and perfect participation of being?

1 84