Timaeus — Plato

the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean. True. This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of 479 opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty — in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold — he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or that anything is one — to him I would appeal, saying.

Will you be so very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is one which will not be found ugly ; or of the just, which will not be found unjust ; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy? No, he replied ; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly ; and the same is true of the rest. And may not the many which are doubles be also halves? — doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another?

Quite true. And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names? True ; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them. And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?

He replied : They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double sense : nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or not-being, or both, or neither. Then what will you do with them? I said.

Can they have a better place than between being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than notbeing, or more full of light and existence than being. That is quite true, he said. Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about

The opposition of knoivledge and opinion.

p. 179

all other things are tossing about in some region which is Republic v. half-way between pure being and pure not-being? Socrates, We have. g^.kx:^o^. Yes ; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge ; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty. Quite true. Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet Opinion is the neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who '^"o^iedge, ' ' . not of the points the way thither; who see the many just, and not absolute, but absolute justice, and the like, — such persons may be said to of^hemany. haye opinion but not knowledge? That is certain. But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to haye opinion only? Neither can that be denied. The one loye and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare 480 say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty. Yes, I remember. Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them loyers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them? 1 shall tell them not to be angry ; no man should be angry at what is true. But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion. Assuredly.

BOOK VI.

Republic VI. Socrates, Gl.AUCON.

If we had time, we might have a nearer view of the true and false philosopher.

Which of them shall tbe our guardians ? A question hardly to be asked.

And thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary steph. way, the true and the false philosophers have at length ap- 4^4 peared in view. I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.

I suppose not, I said ; and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the hfe of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider. And what is the next question? he asked. Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order.

Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State? And how can we rightly answer that question? Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our State — let them be our guardians. Very good.

Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes? There can be no question of that.

And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not