Timaeus — Plato

learned truly to know their own functions, will rule ' over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain ; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-bom subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?

Very true, he said. Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without ; the one counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels? True. And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear? Right, he replied.

And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands ; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole? Assuredly.

And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel? Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual. And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.

That is very certain. And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State? ' Reading -KpocrarTjGtrov with Bekker ; or, if the reading ■Kpoarijotrov, which is found in the MSS., be adopted, then the nominative must be supplied from the previous sentence: ' Music and gymnastic will place in authority over . . . This is very awkward, and the awkwardness is increased by the necessity of changing the subject at TTjpijOETOv.

Republic IK Socrates, Glaucon.

and will be the best defenders both of body and soul.

The courageous.

The wise.

The temperate.

The just.

p. 136

Justice in the individual and in the State.

Republic IV. Socrates, Glaucon. . The nature of justice illustrated by commonplace instances.

We have realized the hope entertained in the first construction of the State.

The three principles harmonize in one.

There is no difference in my opinion, he said. Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying. What sort of instances do you mean? If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a 443 State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver?

Would any one deny this? No one, he rephed. Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country? Never. Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements? Impossible. No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father and mother, or to fail in his religious duties ? No one.

And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled? Exactly so. Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other? Not I, indeed.

Then our dream has been realized ; and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified? Yes, certainly.

And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use? Clearly. But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of