Timaeus — Plato
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TJie first have simple^ the second qualified objects. 1 3 1 it becomes defined, and is hence called not merely science, Repuhik iv. but the science of medicine. Socrates, I quite understand, and I think as you do. Glaucon. 439 Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms, having clearly a relation — Yes, thirst is relative to drink.
And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink ; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only? Certainly. Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only drink ; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it? That is plain.
And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul The law of away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty comradicuon. principle which draws him like a beast to drink ; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.
Impossible. • No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls. Exactly so, he replied. And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink? Yes, he said, it constantly happens. And in such a case what is one to say?
Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him? I should say so. And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and The opposi that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease? Clearly.
Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one another ; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the tion of desire and reason.
p. 132
The story of Leontius.
Republic IV. Socrates, Glaucon.
The third principle of spirit or passion illustrated by an example.
Passion never takes part with desire against reason.
Righteous indignation never felt by a person of noble character when he deservedly suffers.
flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions? Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different. Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding? I should be inclined to say — akin to desire.
Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution.
He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them ; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length 440 the desire got the better of him ; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying. Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight. I have heard the story myself, he said. The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.
Yes ; that is the meaning, he said.
And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason ; — but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed 1, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in any one else?
Certainly not. Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him — these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them. True, he said.
But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, ^ Reading [iri delv avTiirpciTTetv, without a comma after deiv.
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