Timaeus — Plato

I. God is good and the author of good: 2. God is true. 63 which was really the work of Pandarus ^, was brought about Republic 11. by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the Socrates, gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus 2, he shall not have Adeimantus. our approval ; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that ' God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe — the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur — or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking : he oniy that evil must sav that God did what was just and ricrht, and thev ^'^"^^ *^ °*^ -^ .

' •' o 7 •'the nature of were the better for being punished ; but that those who are punishment punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their *° ^^ ^""^" ^ , ' _ uted to God. misery — the poet is not to be permitted to say ; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God ; but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be strenuously i3en]e"d7ahd not to T)e said or sung oFTieard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth.

Such a- fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious. 1 agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law. Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform, — that God is not the author of all things, but of good only. That will do, he said. And what do you think of a second principle?

Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another — sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations ; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image? ' Iliad ii. 69. ' lb. xx.

p. 64

The Divine nature incapable of change.

Republic II. Socrates, Adeimantus. Things must be changed either by another or by themselves.

But God cannot be changed by other; and will not be changed by himself.

I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought. Well, I said ; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing? Most certainly.

And things which are at their best are also least Hable to be altered or discomposed ; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes. Of course. And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused 381 or deranged by any external influence? True.

And the same principle, as I should suppose, appHes to all composite things — furniture, houses, garments : when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances. Very true. Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from without? True. . But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect? Of course they are.

Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes? He cannot. But may he not change and transform himself? Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all. And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly? If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.

Very true, Adeimantus ; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse? Impossible. Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to