The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

77. 5. If there be other circumstances, previous, contemporaneous or posterior to an event, they are all to be included in one of these categories. A Supreme Deity and similar (transcendental) conditions do not exist. Therefore the author puts a limit, «there is no other, fifth, kind of condition)). Entities arise under these conditions, conditions which are not identical with the thing produced. In this sense there is a production (or coordination) with things other (than the thing produced).

77. 8. We answer. Neither are entities produced out of (or coordinated with)

conditions which are (substantially) separate from them.

III. In these conditions we can find
No self-existence of the entities.

Where self-existence is deficient,

Relational existence also lacks.

78. 3. If the produced entities 1 had any preexsistence 2 at all, in (their own)

causes and (conditions) which are something different from (these entities them¬ selves)'— whether in all the complex of them or in some of them separa¬ tely or both in all of them and in every one of them, or (even if they existed) somewhere outside the complex of their causes and conditions, — then alone could they appear out of them. But that is not so. They do not preexist. If they did, they would have been perceived, and their (new) production would have been useless.

78. 6. Therefore the conditions and (causes) of an entity do not contain any real existence 3 (of the result). If they do not contain its real existence, neither do they contain its relational existence. 4 Existence, relation, production 5 (are synonyms). Production out of something extraneous means relation 6 to it, (some kind of preexistence in it). This is impossible. Therefore it is wrong

1 bhavanam karyandm. 2 utpadat purvam sattvam.

s svabhavah. 4 parabhavah.

5 bhavanam bhava utpadah. li bhava , cp. in karya-kdrana-bhdva.

APPENDIX*. CANDRAKlRTl’s COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, I

to maintain that entities can be produced out of conditions which are diffe¬ rent from them.

(But then the Hinayanist would maintain that) the produced entities, 78. 9. such as a sprout etc., do not really exist in their causes, such as seeds etc., as long as the latter have not undergone any change. (But when they are changed the result appears). Otherwise the latter would appear without any cause altogether. (This is what they call their relation to other entities which are their causes).

But in what sense 1 are we to understand the «otherness» 2 of causes 78. n. (and conditions). When both Maitra and his help - mate are present, (we can assert that) they are two separate entities which depend upon one ano¬ ther (in producing a piece of work together). But this kind of coexistence is not found between a seed and a sprout. Therefore when results do not pos¬ sess such separate existence of their own, their relation, the «otherness»(of the sprout) in regard to the seed, is absent. The designation of it as «other» becomes (meaningless) and this alone makes production out of something extraneous impossible.

(The Hinayanist’s appeal to Scripture betrays) his utter ignorance of 78. 13—14. its real intention. Never did the Buddhas preach something contrary to reason. 3 What the real aim of their doctrine is we have indicated above,

(we have namely indicated that the doctrine of causality refers to the phe¬ nomenal world). 4

XLIII. The existence of separate energies denied.

When the philosopher who maintains the origination (of entities out 79. i. of other entities which are) their causes, has been thus dismissed, another one sets forth a theory of origination through (special) energies. 5 The organ of vision, colours and the other causes (of the visual sensation) are not produ¬ cing it directly. They are called causes because they call forth an energy 6 (capable) of producing sensation. This energy 7 then (actually) produces (visual) sensation. Thus the causes, as separate entities, do not produce sen¬ sation. Its (real) producer 8 is a (corresponding) energy, an energy inherent

1 kimapeksa. 2 paratva. 3 yukti-viruddha. 4 Cp. above text, p. 54. 10.

6 Nagiirjuna avails himself of the term kriyd ( — jani-krijd) in the sense of energy or function. Later it is replaced by the term vyapdra which is also used by Candrakirti, cp. p. 329.16.

'* jani-kriya.

kriya.

* irijnana-janila.

11)8 NIRVANA

in the causes 1 and creative 2 of sensation. Analogous is the (physical) energy of heat 3 which produces, e. g., cooked rice.

We answer,

IV. No energies in causes,

Nor energies outside them.

No causes without energies,

Nor causes that possess them.

79 . 7 . If an energy (producing sensation does really exist) it must be asso¬ ciated with such causes as the organ of vision etc. But this is impossible. Why? Because (we will then be asked) whether this assumed energy is sup¬ posed to appear when the sensation already exists or before it or simultane¬ ously with it? (The first alternative must be rejected). If the sensation is already produced, the energy is useless. The energy (is supposed) to produce something. But if it is already produced, what has the energy to do? This has been expressed in our «Madhyamika Introduction)) thus, — 4