The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)
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The translator’s English as printed (F. H. Peters). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
sense such a knowledge means here ; then (2) what is to be reman knows. , - J.1 n 1 -i • 1-1 , • 1 • garded as the held m which continence and incontinence manifest themselves — I mean whether their field be all pleasures and pains, or certain definite classes of these ; then (8), with regard to the continent and the hardy man, whether they are the same or different ; and so on with the other points that are akin to this inquiry.
(But we ought to begin by inquiring whether the species of continence and the species of incontinence of which we are here speaking are to be distinguished from other species by the field of their manifestation or by their form or manner — I mean whether a man is to be called incontinent in this special sense merely because he is incontinent or uncontrolled by reason in certain things, or because he is incontinent in a certain manner, or rather on both grounds; and in connection with this we ought to determine whether or no this incontinence and this continence may be displayed in all things. And our answer to these questions will be that the man who is called simply incontinent, without any qualification, does not display his character in all things, but only in those things in which the profligate manifests himself; nor is it simply an uncontrolled disposition with regard to them that makes him what he is (for then incontinence would be the same as profligacy), but a particular kind of uncontrolled disposition. For the profligate is carried along of his own deliberate choice or purpose, holding that whatp. 215 is pleasant at the moment is always to be pursued; while the incontinent man thinks otherwise, but pursues it all the same.) * [Let us now turn to ([uestion (1).]
As to the argument that it is true opinion and not scientific knowledge against which men act incontinently, it really makes no diSerence here ; for <nme of those who merely have opinions are in no loubt at all, but fancy that they have exact knowledge.
If then it be said that those who have opinion more readily act against their judgment because of the weakness of their belief, we would answer that there is no such difference between scientific knowledge and opinion; for some people have just as strong a belief in their mere opinions as others have